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Abstract Many scholars have wondered if a non-Western theory
of international politics founded on different premises, be it from Asia
or from the “Global South,” could release international relations from
the grip of a Western, “Westphalian” model in which self-interest (and
opposition to the other) and system anarchy treat conflict and violence
as natural and ethical behavior among states. As part of the emergent
literature in Global International Relations, this monograph suggests that
a Buddhist approach to international relations could provide a genuine
alternative. Because of its distinctive philosophical positions and its unique
understanding of reality, human nature, and political behavior, a Buddhist
theory of IR offers a means for transcending the Westphalian predica-
ment. This chapter situates a Buddhist approach to international relations
within the sweep of traditional and recent international relations theory. It
then outlines the subsequent chapters of the monograph that address the
philosophical foundations of Buddhist IR; Buddha’s ideas about politics,
economics, and statecraft; and the manifestations of Buddhist political
principles in practice, one ancient and one modern, that illustrate this
alternative approach.
Keywords Buddhism · Politics · International relations theory
And the crowning superstructure of uncharity is the organized lovelessness of
the relations between state and sovereign state—a lovelessness that expresses
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itself in the axiomatic assumption that it is right and natural for national
organizations to behave like thieves and murderers, armed to the teeth and
ready, at the first favorable opportunity, to steal and kill.
Aldous Huxley1
The Call for an Alternative
Theory of International Relations
Huxley’s characterization of Western international relations (IR) has
led many to question if there might be a different set of axiomatic
assumptions that could lead to more charitable possibilities for interstate
relations. Some scholars have wondered if an alternative perspective such
as a non-Western theory of international politics2 founded on different
premises, be it from Asia or from the “Global South,” could release IR
from the grip of a Western, “Westphalian” model in which self-interest
(and opposition to the other) and system anarchy treat conflict, violence,
and greed as natural and ethical behaviors among states. This monograph
contributes to a growing literature in IR that has taken up that challenge
and suggests that a Buddhist approach to international relations could
provide a meaningful alternative.
Huxley pinpointed what is fundamentally amiss with mainstream
Western IR in the first place: it tolerates (some would say perpetuates)
and fails to remediate a world of existential dangers in terms of warfare
and environmental threats and one of gross inequality and exclusion. To
extricate ourselves from incessant conflict and violence—both physical
and structural—requires a perspective based on a unique and different
understanding of reality, human nature, and the possibilities for polit-
ical behavior. A Buddhist theory of IR offers an alternative vision, a
means for transcending the Westphalian predicament. This book presents
a Buddhist theory of international relations: its philosophical foundations;
its ideas about politics, economics, and statecraft; and its historical and
contemporary expressions.
Many believe that the problem with mainstream IR lies in its Eurocen-
trism, which reduces the scope and utility of its theorizing. By relying on a
limited range of ideas, cultures, politics, histories, and experiences, main-
stream IR ignores or misrepresents the ideas, culture, politics, history,
and experiences of most of the world thereby diminishing its efficacy
in addressing global challenges and undermining its claims of univer-
salism (Acharya 2014). In practical terms, the world is headed for a more
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pluralistic, less Western-dominated future and traditional IR theory must
expand its conceptual repertoire to better understand the distribution of
power, wealth, and influence in the twenty-first century (Acharya and
Buzan 2019).
In response to these shortcomings, recent IR scholarship has generated
several new approaches designed to broaden and improve our under-
standing and practice of international relations. Below, I briefly review
both traditional and emergent IR theories and begin to situate a Buddhist
approach within this theoretical landscape.
A Theoretical Sketch
Unfortunately, Huxley’s lament would go unanswered for several decades.
About the time of Huxley’s writing in the 1940s, Western “Realist” IR
asserted that the eternal verities and “objective laws” of international
relations were the will to dominance; the inherent violence of human
nature; and the natural competition and warfare among autonomous,
sovereign states in anarchy (Morgenthau 1948 at p. 4). These observa-
tions about human nature and state behavior were presented as immutable
truths and are still held as such by some. In reality, however, this view
was only one possible depiction of the world reflecting a distinctive
history, geography, and consciousness. It was founded on Western Euro-
pean experience since the seventeenth century when the establishment of
sovereign, independent units (states) became the cornerstone of Western
IR theory. Sovereignty meant that state actors had the right to rule over
a territory and the people within in it and were legally equal to all other
states in terms of their autonomy and authority. Dominant Western “Real-
ist” IR theory emphasized these independent, not interdependent, states
as actors operating in an anarchic environment, that is, one where there
is no central authority to protect states from each other or to guarantee
their security. It underscored the enduring propensity for conflict among
these autonomous, self-interested states seeking security through self-
help. Realists argued that, given these systemic conditions, international
cooperation will be rare, fleeting, and tenuous—limited by enforcement
problems in anarchy and each state’s preference for larger relative gains
in any potential bargain because of the state’s systemic vulnerability. War,
therefore, was perfectly normal, ethical, and well, “diplomacy by other
means” (von Clausewitz 1989).
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The major alternative theoretical school, “Liberalism,” working in the
same milieu and under the same meta-theoretical assumptions as Realism,
identified ways to mitigate the worst conflictual tendencies of IR through
commercial exchange, shared norms, laws, and institutions. It relaxed
some realist assumptions and introduced3 the concept of interdepen-
dence—reciprocal meaningful connections among states that could shape
characteristically self-interested interactions and facilitate greater cooper-
ation.4 Interdependence, according to some liberals, is always a matter of
degree and kind, but when the density of relations and range of shared
interests are significant, states may construct institutions, norms, and
regimes that act as intervening variables that reduce transaction costs and
raise the cost of cheating for states, thus facilitating international cooper-
ative arrangements. By including a role for internationally shared norms
and institutions in its constructs, Liberalism makes a little room for the
causal power of ideas and interactions, not just a state’s material power
and individual interests, as explanatory factors in IR theory.
Despite these differences, modern versions of Realism and Liber-
alism both adopt a rationalist, and philosophically “realist,” approach to
explaining individual and state choice of action.5 That is, they maintain
that individuals, and by extension states, are (1) atomistic, (2) materi-
ally real, and (3) self-interested actors. Buddhist IR, as we will see in the
next chapter, rests on first principles diametrically opposed to all three
assertions.
Mainstream IR also asserts that these independent, inherently real, and
self-interested actors are “strategic” in that they pursue their principally
self-determined goals in the international political environment, much like
rational economic actors make choices in a marketplace (Smit 2005). The
distinction between the two theories turns largely on whether “rational”
behavior means pursuing relative or absolute gains in exchange relations
with other states, that is, whether the international political system is best
conceived as a zero-sum or a variable-sum game. Buddhism, as discussed
in the following chapter, would instead characterized most individual
and state actions as misdirected (unskillful) and based on misperception
(delusions), but capable of achieving greater clarity and wisdom.
Beginning in the 1980s, IR theory began to offer important alterna-
tives to these traditional approaches that would challenge some of the
underlying philosophical assumptions of Realist and Liberal IR theory and
broaden the scope of theory beyond the experiences and voices of the
West. The most widely accepted alternative was Constructivism, which
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took the idea of interdependence among social actors to a new level. It
maintained that actors and their ideas co-create (“mutually constitute”)
themselves and their social worlds, which makes possible the conceptu-
alization of a wider range of possible behaviors among states or other
actors.6 Constructivism emphasized the role of ideational, nonmaterial
factors both as explanatory variables and as the source of actors’ identities
and interests, in contrast to realist and liberal theories that focus funda-
mentally on the distribution of material capabilities across states in the
international system or institutional structures to explain states’ interests
and actions. Constructivism also challenged the rationalist assumptions of
modern realism and liberalism. For constructivists, actors are not atom-
istic egoists whose interests are largely determined before their strategic
interactions with others. Rather, actors exist in an intersubjective or
“social” reality that shapes their identities (who they are) and interests
(what they want) and, hence, their actions (what they will do). This
social, ideational, interactive accounting for the creation of state identi-
ties, interests, and actions extends the concept of “interdependence” in
constructivist IR theory. This open-ended approach to IR both offered a
different way of thinking about the world and would serve as a bridge to
other novel approaches, including some non-Western theories. Construc-
tivism’s emphasis on interdependence and the power of mental constructs,
for example, trends in the direction of Buddhist thought.
About this time, a wide range of “Critical” IR theories emerged to
challenge what it viewed as the pernicious effects on individuals and
groups of the current state system and world economy. Rather than
seeking to maintain the existing order or marginally improve coopera-
tion among states, Critical IR theory contained an explicit normative,
even teleological, element: IR theory should contribute to the emancipa-
tion of people from repressive social practices (pre-existing knowledge or
gender structures, for example), and institutions (structures of produc-
tion, for instance) and improve social justice within and among societies
defined as greater economic equality and political recognition and agency
for those previously disenfranchised (Ashley 1981; Cox 1996; Linklater
2007).
This vast literature, which includes Poststructural, Postmodern, and
many Feminist writings, cannot be engaged in this short volume, but I
would note several points where Critical theories share common purpose
with Buddhist social thought that the reader will encounter in the chap-
ters that follow. First, Buddhist understandings of politics and economics,
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like Critical theories, sees politics as part of a larger whole, not a sepa-
rate and discreet area of human activity nor one that should be studied
divorced from ethical considerations. Second, Buddhist IR, like Critical
IR, contains both a normative and teleological component, it too sees
as its larger goal as contributing to human liberation. The Buddhist
concept of liberation from suffering differs from what Critical theorist
mean by emancipation and freedom from repression, and the source of
liberation in Buddhism comes necessarily and primarily from within the
individual rather being found principally and originally in the external
worlds of politics and economics. Nonetheless, the end point in both
Buddhist and Critical theory is far more ambitious than mainstream IR.
Third, and related to the second commonality, is a basic humanism and
belief in human equality shared by Critical and Buddhist approaches that
displaces the fixation on states as the sole legitimate agents in the inter-
national system and power predominance as actors primary motivation.
Finally, Critical and Buddhist theories challenge the positivistic episte-
mology of mainstream IR and the notion of theory leading to the discover
of objective facts about politics. Critical and Buddhist approaches assert
that knowledge about the social world is not neutral but depends on the
observer as much as the observed.
Western scholars generated the vast majority of Critical IR theory and
its reasoning was grounded in, or in reaction to, Western philosophical
principles and social theory. Enlightenment, Marxian, and Kantian ideas
figure prominently in Critical theories, for example. Significantly, neither
mainstream IR nor Critical and reflexive theories that oppose it “funda-
mentally question the materiality or identity of the self” (Grovogui 2006
at p. 4). Buddhism, in contrast, offers a different ontological starting
point for the self and social theory that will be discussed in Chapter 2.
One exception to this Western-centric dialogue emerging at about the
same time was Postcolonial scholarship, which gave voice to the experi-
ence of international relations by people and societies formerly colonized
and marginalized by the Western world (Krishna 2009; Hobson 2012;
Sabaratnam 2017). Like Critical theory, it was especially concerned about
disparities in global power and wealth, contained a normative aspiration
for international relations, and did not accede to mainstream theory’s
claims of offering universal or unbiased truths. More so than Critical
theory, however, it focused on the enduring impact of the history of
Western imperialism, colonialism, and racism in shaping the current inter-
national system, which it sees as more hierarchical than anarchical. From
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a Postcolonial perspective, the hierarchical international system was and
remains the product of practices and discourses constructed in the West
that treated non-Western people as “the other,” different from and lesser
than the citizens of the imperial later “major” or “core” powers, and
thus justifiably excluded from voice, power, and prosperity. Postcolonial
literature argues these unequal practices and conceptual biases remain
embedded in the contemporary international system and must be shed or
transformed to create a more just world. Although distinct from Buddhist
IR in many respects, Postcolonial theory shares with Buddhist philosophy
a common belief that holding to a self and other as distinct and unequal
entities is the root of social inequities and conflict and that knowledge
claims about politics are provisional.
Postcolonial theory aside, it has long been recognized that the disci-
pline of international relations traditionally was, and to a lesser extent still
is, anything but international in terms of the individuals composing its
essential theoretical literature. Many have called for greater diversity and
pluralism that includes non-Western voices and ideas previously excluded
as a source of IR theory (Hoffman 1977; Waever 1998; Grovogui 2006;
Jones 2006; Acharya and Buzan 2007, 2010 and 2017; Kayaoglu 2010;
Acharya 2011; Zhang and Buzan 2012; Buzan 2016; Capan 2017).
Scholars offering perspectives from the regions of Latin America, the
Middle East, Africa, and particularly Asia and national approaches to IR
theorizing, particularly Chinese, have answered this call for a non-Western
IR and have recently become a significant part of IR theorizing (Acharya
2011, 2017). Each of these regions has its own distinctive narrative and
contains significant variation within them.
Illustrative of this regional and national diversification in IR litera-
ture is the emergence of a so-called “Chinese School of IR,” which
reflects China’s self-conscious rise as a great power and its prodigious
history, culture, and philosophies (Kang 2010; Qin 2007, 2016, 2018;
Yan 2011; Zhang 2012; Zhao 2009; Wang 2013). Characteristic of
Chinese IR is the blending of Western and Eastern concepts to create
an alternative to mainstream IR. One important example of this work
is Qin Yaqing’s marriage of Confucian notions of harmony and social
or emotional processes occurring between actors (rather than a focus on
rationalistic, autonomous individual actors) with Western constructivism
and relational theory (Qin 2016).7 Qin writes it is “relationality that
determines human actors’ existence and meaning; we can exist only as
‘actors-in-relations’” (Qin 2016 at p. 38). States, therefore, also should
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be understood as existing in relationships—hierarchical, equitable, and
everything in between—not as independent entities. Similarly, the writ-
ings of Yan Xuetong fuse ancient Chinese virtue ethics, including concepts
such as Kingly righteousness, with concepts akin to classical political
Realism in explaining the rise of great powers in international relations
(Yan 2011).8 Perhaps best known is Zhao Tingyang’s application of
the concept Tianxing (all-under-heaven) as the basis for an idealistic
world order that is fair, impartial to all, harmonious, and cooperative.
Zhao contrasts this “world-building” project to the state-building and
conflictual relations associated with Westphalian IR (Zhao 2006, 2018).
Some have critiqued this literature as parochial and nationalistic (Callahan
2008), that is, too Chinese, others as “derivative,” that is, too Western-
influenced (Shih and Yu 2015). Buddhist ideas are curiously absent from
this literature, but as will be seen in the next chapter, Buddhist theory
parallels Qin’s writings and others as it is also based on a relational
understanding of reality.
Moving beyond the binary of Western and non-Western IR is the
recent call for a “Global IR,” first articulated by Amitav Acharya in 2014,
which seeks to transcend the distinction between West and non-West (the
“Rest”) in a way that encourages diversity and improved understanding
(Acharya 2014). Acharya outlined what he hoped would be the defining
features of Global IR to include its:
•foundation on “pluralistic universalism,” meaning that IR theory that
does not necessarily apply to all but recognizes and respects the diversity
of humankind as it searches for common ground between foundational
approaches;
•grounding in world history, not just Western history;
•inclusion, not exclusion, of existing IR theories and methods,
including the relevance of both ideational and material factors in theo-
rizing;
•integration of the study of regions;
•rejection of theory based on cultural or state exceptionalism;
•recognition of multiple forms of agency beyond the state and material
power; and
•responsiveness to the increasing globalization of the world including
the diffusion of wealth, power, and cultural authority and growing
interdependence and shared fates.
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The discussion of a Buddhist approach to IR in following chapters meets
many of these aspirations.
In discussing the various founts for theoretically rich Global IR,
Acharya and Buzan note that one critical source will be classical religious
and philosophical traditions. Here too, this invitation has not gone unan-
swered. In recent publications scholars have generated novel IR theories
that draw on sources as diverse as the application of Japanese thought
(Rösch and Watanabe 2018), Sufism (Shahi 2018, 2020), Daoism (Ling
2014), Islam (Sheikh 2016), Ubuntu (Mandrup and Smith 2014), and
Indian philosophy (Malhotra 2011; Shahi and Ascione 2015; Shahi
2019). Notably, this incipient work has largely ignored Buddhist ideas in
the study of international relations despite the recognition that Buddhism
could be a promising foundation for an alternative approach to IR
(Acharya and Buzan 2019 at p. 311; but see, Chan, et al. 2001; Moore
2016; Chavez-Segura 2012). This book is an attempt to fill that gap.
In discussing the promise of a Buddhist IR, Acharya expressed a reser-
vation about our ability to bridge the “strict separation between this and
other-worldliness, and between the material and spiritual” raised by the
great religious traditions. He asks specifically whether Buddhist ideas like
dependent origination (introduced in the next chapter) are “too unscien-
tific or other-worldly to deserve a place in IR?” (Acharya 2011 at p. 636).
While this short study cannot lay this question to rest, in the concluding
chapter I will briefly address how a Buddhist approach to social theory is
surprisingly consistent with our best scientific understandings of the phys-
ical and biological world coming from post-Newtonian quantum physics
and emerging findings in neuroscience.
Much like Global IR, the premise of this work is that there is great
value in a dialogue between non-Western IR theory and Western polit-
ical philosophy and theory. In the case of Buddhism, I would argue
that such a dialogue can be a particularly fruitful conversation because
these systems of thought are “sufficiently proximate to each other [to
be] mutually intelligible, but sufficiently distant from one another that
each has something to learn from the other” (Garfield 2015 at p. xi).
This manuscript hopes to catalyze that dialogue with those who study
international relations.
10 W. J. LONG
Chapter Outline
Beginning in Chapter 2, this study asserts that a Buddhist perspective
provides a systematic and genuine alternative to Western models of IR not
so much because it arose in Asia, but because it is founded on distinc-
tive first-order philosophical principles or substructures that differ from
those that dominate in the West. The book introduces this fundamentally
different worldview through the concept of “radical interdependence”—
the basic Buddhist “truth” about the nature of our existence and ourselves
that departs from most Western understandings of reality and interde-
pendence. Buddhism’s unique ontology asserts that we are not atomistic,
independent entities and that, when we fully realize this basic truth, our
natural underlying social disposition is equanimity and altruism, not self-
ishness. Together, these Buddhist philosophical claims offer a different
starting point for thinking about ourselves and the world we live in,
one it characterizes as deeply interdependent. Moreover, Buddhism main-
tains that the failure to appreciate the full extent of interdependence is
the ultimate source of all conflicts, up to and including interstate war,
whereas an understanding the truth of radical interdependence is the key
to imagining a different vision for politics, economics, and IR.
Having explained the distinctive philosophical foundations of Buddhist
thought in Chapter 2, the monograph then outlines doctrinal Buddhist
political and economic theory9 in Chapter 3, including its notions about
interstate relations, which are based on its unique understanding of the
nature of reality. Although largely unknown, a Buddhist approach to poli-
tics, economics, and international relations is not a mere extrapolation
of Buddhist philosophical principles but can be found throughout the
Buddhist canon.
Some readers may be surprised to hear that there exists a theory of
politics, economics, and statecraft in Buddha’s teachings.10 But in fact,
Buddha spoke extensively about politics, economics, and society, contrary
to the claim of Max Weber who famously asserted that Buddhism was “a
specifically a-political and anti-political status religion” (Weber 1958 at
p. 206). Although the overriding goal of Buddha’s teachings is the liber-
ation of individuals from pervasive suffering, Buddha considered politics
and economics as important, not so much for their intrinsic value, but
because they create an external environment that can facilitate or impede
an individual’s pursuit of happiness, defined as spiritual advancement and
achievement of wisdom about the true nature of oneself and the world.
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Although best understood as an extension of his teachings on human
liberation, Buddha was also an innovative social thinker and a significant
political and economic philosopher (Iliah 2000). Buddha’s original
social and political teachings include: rejecting the prevailing hierarchical
social order of his day and asserting individual equality; appealing to
human reason and pragmatism in solving real-world problems; offering
a contractual theory of the state 2000 years before Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau; creating a model for an egalitarian, institutionalized
democracy in his order of monks and nuns a century before the origins
of Western democracy; calling for a federation of like-minded states to
keep the peace internationally two millennia before Kant’s famous essay
on perpetual peace; and arguing for sustainable economic growth ages
before that idea occurred in the West. Chapter 3 outlines Buddha’s
political and economic theory, including his thoughts about statecraft
and the possibilities for international order.
It should be noted that, in general, one can discuss the relationship
between Buddhism and politics in two ways that are often conflated or
confused. On the one hand, we can study what Buddha himself said
about politics, that is, his words as recorded in the sūtras (fundamental
teachings) and the vinaya (instructions for the ordained community).
I call this doctrinal approach “Buddha on Politics,” and that will be
the method adopted in Chapter 3. I rely on mining this expansive
literature because it is the most essential and unfettered source for under-
standing Buddhist politics in this meaning of the phrase. Looking at
subsequent interpretations of Buddha’s social teachings are, by defini-
tion, secondary and derivative and sometimes distorted for contemporary
exigencies (think twentieth-century Japanese Fascism, for example), and
will not be engaged here in this concise publication format.
On the other hand, one can approach the question of Buddhist poli-
tics by examining how, in practice, Buddhism and politics interact in a
particular setting or settings either historically or presently, as Buddhism
has shaped many societies throughout Asia, and there is a literature that
considers the numerous examples of the relationship between Buddhism
and the state (See, e.g., Harris 1999). I call this type of investigation
“Buddhism and Politics,” and in Chapters 4 and 5, I consider Buddhism
and politics in the ancient Aśokan empire and in contemporary Bhutan.
These two case studies serve as empirical referents for a Buddhist
approach to politics, economics, and statecraft and as “proofs of concept”
for the possibility of applying Buddhist ideas in practice. Why these
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two cases and not others? I chose these two cases because they most
vividly and authentically illustrate a Buddhist approach to statecraft.
Other ancient or medieval empires after Aśoka’s either were not defini-
tively Buddhist in character or left insufficient documentary evidence
of their governing principles and policies.11 As for modern countries,
I would argue that Bhutan is uniquely politically Buddhist, and that
other countries, such as Thailand, Sri Lanka, or Myanmar, do not present
comparable cases for understanding modern Buddhist statecraft. Because
of its Himalayan location, its centuries of closure to the outside world,
and the good fortune of having avoided conquest by invading Tibetans,
Mongols, and Brits, when Bhutan emerged as an independent state on
the world stage in the second half of the twentieth century, it did so
with its 1300-year-old Buddhist belief and value system fully intact. The
ideas of the European Enlightenment, capitalism, or later ideologies,
such as Marxism or fascism, never penetrated Bhutan. The foundation
for its political identity is unique: it is the only country in the world
rooted constitutionally and culturally in Mahayana Buddhist principles
and ethics.12 Other countries in the world have a predominantly Buddhist
population to be sure, but because they have been colonized (except
Thailand), and influenced by Western political thought and integrated
into the global marketplace for centuries, little is left of their political and
economic systems that is distinctively and conclusively Buddhist. They are
culturally Buddhist, not politically and economically Buddhist nations.
Thus, if we are looking to succinctly compare a Buddhist approach to
statecraft relative to dominant Western approaches, which is the point of
empirical chapters of the book, Bhutan provides the most powerful and
pristine exemplar in the modern world (Long 2019).
Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of essential features of a Buddhist
approach to thinking about the world, our role in it, and the type of polit-
ical environments conducive to our higher nature. I argue that Buddhist
principles for good government, economics, and statecraft provide general
guidelines for developing adaptable solutions to contemporary political,
economic, and international problems. The chapter also engages the
question of the scientific quality of a Buddhist approach to IR.13
Notes
1. Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy, New York: Harper Perennial
Modern Classic, 2004, p. 94.
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2. I adopt an ecumenical approach to defining IR theory recommended by
Acharya and Buzan as including: (1) positivist, rationalist, materialist, and
quantitative approaches; (2) reflectivist, social, constructivist, and post-
modern approaches; and (3) normative or emancipatory approaches that
strive not so much to explain or understand international relations as to
set out ideas about how and why it might be improved (Acharya and
Buzan 2010 at p. 3).
3. The concept was not, of course, wholly new. Its origins can be found
it the writings of Grotius and, in the twentieth century, in the works of
Hedley Bull and others who emphasize the existence of an international
society of states, not just an international system (Bull 1977).
4. Interdependence refers to two qualities of interconnectedness that are
important: sensitivity and vulnerability. The former refers to the shared
impact of interactions and the latter to the significance of an interruption
in interstate relations (Keohane 1984).
5. In metaphysics, realism about a given object is the view that the object
exists independently of our conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic
practices, beliefs etc.
6. Alexander Wendt, for example, argues that a constructivist approach
to international relations allows for at least three kinds of possible
system structure. These three structures are the Hobbesian, Lockean,
and Kantian. They are, respectively, characterized by relations of enmity,
rivalry, and friendship among states (Wendt 1999).
7. Unlike the atomistic ontology of Western theorizing, relationality begins
by assuming interconnectedness existing prior to the defining of individual
entities. This approach, like a Buddhist one, unites observer and observed
and argues no things exist in isolation. A relational approach to IR was
formally described by Jackson and Nexon (1999) in the West and has
been adopted in the East as a way of conceptualizing traditional Asian
explanation for politics.
8. Emilian Kavalski combines the notion of guanxi (the establishing and
maintaining of a functioning network of reciprocal obligation among
actors) and relational theory in a novel East–West explanation of inter-
national affairs (Kavalski 2018).
9. For a contemporary, non-Western view of Buddha’s political writings see
Ilaiah, 2000.
10. The word “Buddha” is not a proper name, but a descriptor meaning
the “awakened one.” The Buddha’s name was Siddhārtha Gautama
Sākyamuni (great one of the Sākya tribe). Although the designator “Bud-
dha” is not limited to this one individual, for convenience sake and given
common convention, the text will refer to “Buddha” rather than “the
Buddha,” which is more grammatically correct.
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11. The closest possibilities were the empire of the first Japanese Buddhist
ruler, Prince Shotoku (c. 574–622), and the twelfth-century Khmer
emperor, Jayavarman VII. Prince Shotoku was schooled in Buddhism
and built temples throughout the country. Unfortunately, his supposed
seminal political work, the Seventeen-article Constitution, which contains
provisions of both a Buddhist and Confucian nature, is most likely not
the work of Prince Shotoku (that is a national myth) and was actu-
ally composed a century later by unknown authors who attributed it to
Shotoku to give it legitimacy. So, there is no reliable record of Prince
Shotoku’s political thought that compares with Ashoka’s edicts. Emperor
Jayavarman VII, although clearly establishing a Mahayana Buddhist
empire of size and duration, left no documentary historical record and
is known by the prolific art and architecture produced during his reign.
This physical record has been mined for occasional political extrapola-
tions or inferences by art historians, but, after reviewing this literature, I
concluded that it does not create a workable record for social scientists.
12. The 2008 Constitution of Bhutan provides: Buddhism is the spiritual
heritage of Bhutan, which promotes the principles and values of peace,
non-violence, compassion, and tolerance. … The State shall strive to create
conditions that will enable the true and sustainable development of a
good and compassionate society rooted in Buddhist ethics and universal
human values” (Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 2008, Art. 3.1;
Art. 9.20). Nowhere is the influence of Buddhism on the state as total as
it is in Bhutan.
13. “Science,” here, refers to both Newtonian physical science and post-
Newtonian quantum physics as well as the biological sciences.
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Philosophical Foundations for Social Theory
Abstract This Chapter asserts that a Buddhist perspective provides a
systematic and genuine alternative to Western models of IR not so much
because it arose in Asia, but because it is founded on distinctive first-
order philosophical principles or substructures that differ from those that
dominate in the West. The chapter explains this fundamentally different
worldview through the concept of “radical interdependence”—the basic
Buddhist “truth” about the nature of our existence that departs from
most Western understandings of reality and interdependence. Buddhism
offers a different starting point for thinking about the world we live in,
one it characterizes as deeply interdependent. Moreover, Buddhism main-
tains that the failure to appreciate the full extent of interdependence limits
our human potential and is the ultimate source of all conflicts, up to and
including interstate war, whereas an understanding the truth of radical
interdependence is the key to imagining a different vision for politics and
IR.
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Buddhism’s Radical Interdependence
The concept of radical interdependence is the basis for developing an
alternative, global IR theory based on Buddhist philosophy. Before
outlining essential Buddhist principles, however, one qualification is in
order. Because Buddhism has existed for thousands of years and has
spread across Asia and more recently to the West without being orga-
nized by a unified institutional authority, it must be noted that there
are numerous, divergent forms of Buddhist thought and practice. It is
said that Buddha gave 84,000 teachings in all and each of them has
been the subject of multiple translations, interpretations, and debates for
millennia. With this caveat, it is still possible to distill a fundamental core
of commonly held Buddhist tenets (Gethin 1998).
Buddhism asserts that every functioning thing we perceive arises (and
ceases) in dependence on its causes and conditions, its parts, and the minds
that perceive it; like a rainbow that appears to our senses when heat,
light, and moisture come together in a certain manner and dissolves when
those conditions change. In its original Pāli transcription,1 this principle
is known as the doctrine of dependent origination (patica-samuppada in
Pāli, in Sanskrit, pratitya-samutpada) expressed poetically in the verse:
When this is, that is
This arising, that arises
When this is not, that is not
This ceasing, that ceases (SN.12:61).
The doctrine asserts that reality (including our “self”) lacks a fixed,
inherent, or essential nature (a concept known as anātta in Pāli, anātman
in Sanskrit) and, on analysis, can be decomposed into other, simpler
elements,2 and that all things are impermanent (anicca in Pāli, anitya
in Sanskrit), the product of ever-changing causes and conditions.
The individual self, for example, at any given moment is in fact made
up of various physical and mental elements (aggregates),3 and the notion
of an enduring self is illusory, albeit an illusion that is hard to dispel.4 This
approach is known as a “reductionist” definition of the self, which differs
from so-called “essentialist” approaches to the self that dominate in the
West.5 For certain functional purposes, one may choose to refer to selves
or objects in keeping with worldly conventions, but ultimately the self and
other phenomena lack a fixed, inherent nature in Buddhist thought. The
conventional reference to the self and other objects, up to and including
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nation-states, is meaningful if properly understood, however, because it
can serve practical, functional purposes and because it can eventually lead
one to understanding the ultimate nature of things through sustained
analysis.6
Given this reductionist understanding of “self” and all objects of
existence, radical interdependence maintains that the alleged separation
between self and others and between enduringly real subjects and objects,
which is the Archimedean starting point (ontologically) for realist, liberal,
and even many constructivist approaches7 to politics in the West, is ulti-
mately incorrect, a misperception. According to Buddhism, the alleged
separation is a “delusion” or “ignorance” (of the nature of reality).
Instead, a Buddhist social paradigm necessarily begins with the funda-
mental truth of the essential interdependence and impermanence of all
reality, including ourselves (the no-self doctrine). It asserts a radical inter-
dependence between individuals and between humans and their social and
natural environments. This Buddhist ontology is analogous in modern
thinking to a form of radical relationalism in Western social thought and
quantum theory in the natural world, a point I return to in the concluding
chapter.
Epistemologically, this means the notion of fixed, objective reality is an
impossibility. Given that the only ultimate truth is the lack of inherent
existence, all other forms of knowledge are provisional or “conventional”
truths. It is important to reiterate, however, that our conventional notions
of reality are a form of truth in that they can help us function in the world
and, when used correctly, can lead individuals to a realization of ulti-
mate truth, which is the source of liberation from suffering in Buddhism.
Because conventional truths perform practical and soteriological func-
tions, Buddhist epistemology has developed a sophisticated literature
regarding what constitutes “reliable forms of knowledge,” (pramān. as,
in Sanskrit), generally held to be a product of our direct perceptions
or logically drawn inferences. In seeking reliable knowledge, Buddhism
emphasizes personal experience, a pragmatic attitude, and the use of
critical, skillful, and contextual thinking toward all types of knowledge,
including Buddhist teachings! Buddha did not ask for blind faith or
allegiance: “One must not,” Buddha says, “accept my Dhamma from
reverence but first try it as gold is tried by fire” (Jayatilleke 2008).
Misunderstanding the deeper, radically interdependent nature of reality
has severe consequences, according to Buddhism. It leads to problem-
atic actions (karma)8 that result in suffering (dukkha in Pāli, duhkha, in
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Sanskrit). Grasping and cherishing a false sense of independence and a
desire for permanence keeps us locked in pervasive suffering (samsara
in Pāli or Sanskrit). In short, all our problems, including complex polit-
ical problems, and all the unwanted consequences of our actions flow
from a basic misunderstanding of the radical interdependence of reality.
As the twelfth century Buddhist monk, Geshe Chekowa instructs in his
Seven Points in Training the Mind, “Place all blame on the one.” By
this he means blame the delusion of self-grasping and self-cherishing
as the true source of all our problems and suffering. Buddha’s teach-
ings, beginning with his first teaching on the Four Noble Truths, are
designed to illuminate (1) the problem of suffering (birth, aging, sickness,
death, and existential uncertainty); (2) its source (self-grasping igno-
rance); (3) its means of cessation (awakening to an understanding of the
true nature of reality and ourselves); and (4) the path to the cessation of
suffering (mindful ethical behavior and meditation to inculcate virtue and
wisdom).9
This fundamental mistake leads to reifying oneself and objects of desire
or aversion in the belief that protecting and cherishing ourselves and our
desires and harming and destroying our enemies and aversions will bring
us security and happiness. This tendency is only made worse in collec-
tives, like states, nations, and institutions, which are projections based
on a false premise (Macy 1979). Paradoxically, and directly contrary to
our ordinary belief, self-reification and grasping at self and objects, from
a Buddhist perspective, do not bring happiness but only discord and
dissatisfaction. The championing of the autonomous and independent
self (and, necessarily, an alien other), from a Buddhist viewpoint, will not
promote individual or social well-being. Instead this dualistic thinking will
produce dissatisfaction, personal insecurity, incessant striving, conflict, and
violence. Taken to its logical conclusion, clinging to an autonomous self
and exalting self-interest are the sources of social and political division,
and they perpetuate political systems, including our current international
system, which have created military and environmental threats that could
consume us.
The Buddhist ontology of interdependence and impermanence leads to
a different starting point for the social/political world and individual well-
being and a way out of this dilemma. Buddhism is the basis for a politics
of radical interdependence and, ultimately, what Buddhists call “fearless-
ness,” that is, caring equally for others’ welfare. The latter connotes
that individuals have the potential of overcoming perceived duality and
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accepting the creative possibilities and moral responsibility of open-ended
impermanence and interdependence. According to Buddha, one’s nature,
when realized through training the mind to understand the true nature
of reality, makes equanimity, unselfishness, and cooperation our natural,
underlying social disposition, not self-interest, because caring equally
for all is only logical when one fully realizes the truth of our radical
interdependence. Human nature in Buddhism contains the essence of
enlightenment, a fully awakened being, called our “Buddha nature” in
some Buddhist schools.10 This alternative view of human nature is the
second major difference between Buddhist social theory and those of the
West, a difference that follows from the first and fundamental difference:
the Buddhist assertion that all reality is radically interdependent. As will
be discussed in the next chapter, our political systems can and should,
therefore, reflect and support individuals in recognizing this fundamental
truth and in realizing their underlying nature.
Buddhist ontology encourages our connection with, not separateness
from, others. By this logic, empathy (feeling with others) is fundamental
to human nature, and altruism (acting on behalf of others) and coop-
eration are humans’ deep-seated behavioral traits, our fundamental and
unbound nature. Separateness and selfishness are the result of pervasive
but mistaken conceptions that lead to negative actions—greed (attrac-
tion to objects that do not exist as they appear and do not endure),
anger (aversion to such false objects), false pride, and jealousy—and thus
suffering. Buddhist logic does not deny the prevalence of our more selfish
or conflictual traits. Instead, Buddhism suggests only that a selfish, fearful
orientation is not humans’ fundamental nature and therefore ultimately
is an erroneous starting point for designing political institutions and poli-
cies. While Buddhism acknowledges that individuals may behave in selfish
or discordant ways, this behavior is considered the result of “adventitious
defilements,” like mud in water. Because these defilements are not part
of one’s true nature, they can be removed by following the teachings to
reveal a root mind which is clear, altruistic, compassionate, and wise, like a
Buddha’s. For Buddhists, an innate empathetic and altruistic orientation
is a real possibility because it accords with the how things actually exist,
i.e. interdependently, and it is an option that can be chosen and worked
toward.
Buddhism does not disagree with Western philosophers that self-
interest appears to drive most behavior. But it does differ when we ask the
question: “What is the base-line position regarding the social emotions
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and thoughts that form our human nature?” Is our root nature fundamen-
tally self-interested or altruistic? Clearly, ample evidence can be found in
everyday social behavior to suggest that self-interested behavior is ubiq-
uitous. But pointing to evidence of selfish behavior may mislead us about
human’s root nature. Just as we “see” physical reality as corresponding to
classical propositions of subject–object dualism (although, for Buddhists,
reality ultimately does not exist this way), Buddhism would argue that,
despite their appearances, we are mistaken about the ultimate reality of
our human nature, too, and our prescriptions for social behavior reflect
that basic misunderstanding.
Buddhism asserts that human beings only behave in ways that are
selfish and often discordant if they misperceive the real nature of their
existence and if they suffer from delusions about the nature of themselves
and reality. If individuals remain attached to the notion of themselves
as separate from, and in opposition to, other selves and all other things
(the classical Western ontology), when push comes to shove they will
act predominantly in selfish and non-cooperative ways. From a Buddhist
perspective, individual and social pathologies such as violence and destruc-
tiveness, or merely sub-optimal levels of cooperation, are ultimately linked
to misguided efforts to find certainty and separateness in a world that is
indeterminate and interdependent, not from our basic makeup.
According to Buddhism, the mistaken feeling of duality between the
world and “us” feeds our incessant insecurity and fears and drives our
preoccupation with power and control over others and our environments
to secure ourselves. Averring the truth of this duality, Western political
thinkers typically begin their social thinking with the dilemma of how,
through the social contract, to control the clash of interests seen as
inherent in human individualistic pursuits and thereby secure the bene-
fits of social order without unduly constricting individual freedom. This
alleged dilemma has been the starting point for all Western contract theo-
ries of social organization from Hobbes to Rawles. Buddhism does not
begin with the self at the center of the universe but describes a decentered
world, where what is to be feared are delusions of independence that keep
humans in suffering, rather than fearing perceived external threats to the
security of what they consider a constructed self.
This depiction of human nature and natural conduct is not intended
to suggest that there is an inevitable nexus between an intellectual
understanding of our ontological status and social behavior in prac-
tice. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Rather, Buddhist ontology
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provides a paradigmatic orientation that can unlock thinking about certain
social possibilities that are fundamentally different from those based on
Western, Cartesian assumptions. Buddhist philosophy does not change
the widespread expression of selfish behavior; rather it treats that behavior
not as human beings’ ultimate nature, but as our choice, albeit a choice
made under the pervasive delusion of duality. For Buddhists, dualistic
thinking based on independent selves and objects is a constructed reality
that can be deconstructed, not so much through clever philosophical
discourse, but through hard work via mindfulness and meditation that
teaches one to recognize and transform one’s own thoughts, intentions,
and emotions and the behaviors that ultimately flow from them.
Because, in Buddhism, political and economic systems necessarily
reflect the mentality of the individuals within them, that is to say, our
present world is the expression of the collective karma (actions) of its
inhabitants, the starting point of the work needed to recognize a more
cooperative society is self-transformation, but government, the economy,
and even the international system can structure themselves consistent with
the fundamental wisdom of radical interdependence to provide supportive
environments for the attainment of humans’ true nature and lasting
happiness.11 These helpful social provisions are known as “conducive
conditions” in Buddhism. Buddhist social and political designs are instru-
mental: they exist not for their own sake, but as an important means for
supporting individuals’ progress along a path that culminates in wisdom
and transcendence of suffering. In Buddhist metaphorical language, these
conditions are a raft that carries us to the other shore, not an end in
themselves.
Radical interdependence as the nature of existence applies equally
across the different “levels of analysis” in IR (individual, state, and state
system), with primacy/originality given to the individual level. States and
the state system are the summation, projection, and institutionalization
of individual ways of thinking, an intersubjective consensus, as construc-
tivists would say. The underlying nature of the state and state system is
contingent on the individuals who compromise them, an assertion that
reflects Buddhism basic humanism.12 As discussed, these individual selves,
in turn, lack a permanent essence. Individuals, states, and the state system
are, therefore, all changeable phenomena. Individuals have the capacity to
shape the character of their minds, and thereby, their institutions, such as
the state and the state system (Chavez-Segura 2012). The scientific basis
of these assertions is touched on in the final chapter.
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Peace and social progress, therefore, depend ultimately on the indi-
vidual. At an individual level, the ontology of radical interdependence
and no-self implies an alternative ethics or way of being in the world.
Primarily, this view encourages a reduced attachment to self and thus
undercuts selfishness—the basic Western assumption about human nature
(Harvey 2000). The movement away from an essentialist self toward no-
self implies “a drift toward impartiality and impersonality, a lessening of
the gap between persons since my relation to others is not so significantly
different from my relation to my own past and future” (Perrett 2002 at
p. 375). By focusing more on a collection of experiences and less on an
immutable self, we can view others and ourselves with greater equanimity.
Through familiarity with no-self, a person experiences reduced egoistic
concern and recognizes that the pursuit of her own welfare is not funda-
mentally different from her regard for the well-being of others. Operating
under this ontological stance means our responsibility to our future selves
rests not on selfishness, but largely on a pragmatic rationale: we are well
situated to affect the well-being of ourselves (and our intimates), and
therefore should act to promote the welfare (or reduce the suffering)
of those we are in the best position to help. Moreover, failure to look
after our “self” would make us of little value to “others.” This immediate
concern, however, does not detract from our obligation to avoid harming
and to promote the welfare of others more distant from ourselves to the
extent we can do so. The Buddhist path for achieving this level of personal
development is reducible to ethical conduct and shaping our thoughts
and emotions to remove negativity and replace it with positive thoughts
and emotions (such as generosity and compassion) through the prac-
tice of mindfulness, concentration, and meditation. These same practices
can also lead ultimately to an “awakening” to the wisdom that realizes
radical interdependence directly. This worldview is directly opposed to
the egoism, separation of self from other, fear, insecurity, competition,
domination, conflict, violence, and revenge that have traditionally been
considered natural elements of politics and IR in the West.13 Radical
interdependence, if realized, can lead instead to a sense of connection,
community, tolerance, responsibility, and ultimately, a universal sense of
humanity and a greater willingness to find common purpose according
to Buddhism. As individuals develop these abilities, by extension, they
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develop more peaceful and cooperative social institutions, which, in turn,
support individuals in their material and spiritual ambitions. The next
chapter looks at the nature of the social and political institutions that
Buddhism prescribes.
Notes
1. Buddha’s words were first transcribed in the Pāli Canon. I rely on it to
distill Buddha’s ideas about the political world in Chapter 3. The Pāli
Canon is the earliest authoritative text of Buddha’s teachings. It is often
called the Tipit.aka (“three baskets”) and includes the vinaya, disciplines
for the monastic order; sūtras, discourses; and the abhidharma, further
teachings of a philosophical and psychological nature.
2. One could go further with this ontological inquiry and ask “What, then,
is the ontological status of the parts or aggregates that make up the
objects we perceive?” This is a very complex question and has spawned
numerous different schools of thought about fundamental ontology in
Buddhism, much like in the West. Some early Buddhists were philosoph-
ically “realist,” arguing that the elements of existence, while reducible to
simpler parts or causes, were ultimately materially real and truly existent
(the Vaibhās.ika school, for example). Other Buddhist traditions, such as
certain branches of the Sautrāntika school, maintained that elemental
particles of reality are representationally real, i.e., that both cognition
and external objects have some ontological status, analogous to Western
critical realism. Still other Buddhist schools, like the Cittamātra, or the
Yogācāra, are comparable to Western philosophical idealists, asserting that
all phenomena are the same nature as the mind that apprehends them and
do not exist external to the mind. Buddha, himself, eschewed discussions
of metaphysics for a pragmatic approach to human problems.The spirit of
Buddha’s anti-metaphysical stance is adopted in the Middle Way (Madhya-
maka) philosophy captured most systematically in the works of Nāgārjuna
(second century CE). This approach also has sub-schools within it, but
in Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka-Prasaṅgika philosophy, he adopts a skep-
tical or what we might call deconstructivist or post-modern orientation to
ontological assertions. Nāgārjuna, and his followers clarified the argument
that all phenomena are empty (śūnya) of inherent existence, but can be
usefully understood to exist conventionally and provisionally. He argued
for a “Middle Way,” which, in this context, means steering a path between
eternalism (things have a fixed and enduring nature) and nihilism (every-
thing is relative and our reality has no meaning). In the Madhyamaka,
conventional, ever-changing truth is still meaningful because it allows
the law of karma (cause and effect) to operate—if reality were fixed and
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inherently real, such changes would not be possible, and one could not
make progress along the spiritual path to enlightenment. According to
this school, eventually one can come to understand that all phenomena
have both a conventional and ultimate nature (emptiness) and the two
natures are non-contradictory or unified. For example, emptiness is not
an abstraction apart from conventional reality; emptiness is always the
ultimate nature of some conventional object. Colloquially, ultimate and
conventional truths are two sides of the same coin. Nāgārjuna did not
offer these insights as affirmative ontological claims, but only as methods
for deconstructing all other ontological assertions that might stand in the
way making the changes necessary to liberate ourselves from suffering.
3. These “aggregates” (skandhas, in Sanskrit, khandhas, in Pāli) that make
up persons include: (1) material composition or form; (2) sensations
(feelings); (3) perception; (4) mental activity (formations); and (5)
consciousness. Clinging to these aggregates as inherent real rather than
recognizing their evanescent nature is a fundamental mistake that leads to
suffering.
4. Buddhists, unlike Western thinkers such as David Hume discussed in the
footnote below, believe that it is possible to realize the non-essential
nature of the self (the no-self) and necessary to try to do so to liberate
oneself from suffering.
5. Reductionism argues that one’s existence or continuity as a person can be
understood as reducible to certain other facts about physical or psycholog-
ical connectedness that are ontologically more basic than the individual.
The mind links together closely related mental and physical states to
fabricate the notion of a self that continues across time (Parfit 1984).
Dismantling this artifice of self requires sustained analysis, contemplation,
and meditation. Essentialism asserts that the self or individual typically
is considered to have an essence: persons are separately existing entities,
distinct from their brains and bodies and their experiences or, alternatively,
persons are wholly and solely their brain and body. In the former case,
the argument is that, in addition to the various parts that contribute to
the psychophysical complex of the person, one extra part constitutes the
core or essence of the system. An essentialist approach tends to refer to
this special part as the “self.” There are many candidates for what consti-
tutes this non-reducible essence. For Plato, this essence was the immaterial
and immortal soul. For Augustine, an immaterial soul and material body
makes one self, and, for others, some brute physical continuity (usually the
brain) constitutes the self. The latter notion, that is, the self as the total
person (mind and body), accords with our commonsensical notion that
we simply “are who we are,” a physical and mental system that persists as a
single entity from one period to the next, ending perhaps at death. Either
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way, ontologically, this self persists over time and has genuine autonomous
causal and explanatory powers that cannot be reduced to the causal and
explanatory powers of its constituent parts. Although essentialism is the
historical norm for understanding the nature of the self in the West, the
range of thinking is wide, and a minority of Western philosophers grav-
itate toward the reductionist end of the spectrum. Kant, Nietzsche, and
Heidegger all have reductionist views of the self, for example. At the far
end of the spectrum, a very few Western philosophers, such as David
Hume, reject the notion of self or personal identity. It is possible that
Hume was familiar with Buddhism (Gopnik 2009). Hume does not posit
a substantial self that exists beyond one’s experiences. (Giles 1993). How
then do we account for the everyday perception of a self? Hume explains
that we misconstrue this flow of diverse perceptions as an enduring iden-
tity because the many independent experiences resemble each other. When
successive perceptions resemble each other, it is easy for us to imagine
that the first simply persists. Our imaginative propensity to misconstrue an
identity from diversity begins in infancy and continues unabated without
our awareness of the misperception. For Hume, discussions about the self
are merely verbal exercises. The self then can be addressed at two levels:
on ultimate or metaphysical terms where we should recognize that there
is no self; and on a conventional, verbal, or grammatical level of social
standard, where it can be convenient or useful to designate a self (Hume
1739 [2000]). Buddhists reached the same general conclusion 2000 years
previously.
6. These so-called “conventional truths” are only true in the sense that they
function to achieve our conventional purposes—like a tea kettle functions
to help make a cup of tea, but it does not exist in an ultimate sense
apart from its parts (handle, spout, etc.) or our designation of its parts as
a “kettle.” Conventional “truth” is truth in that it can be distinguished
from conventional falsehoods. The kettle on the stove is a conventional
truth, whereas averring the reflection of a kettle in a mirror as a kettle is
a conventional falsehood in that it will not function in an everyday sense
to help us make tea. Conventional reality is known as the second truth of
reality in the doctrine of the Buddhist doctrine of the “two truths.” The
two truths doctrine maintains that the self and objects of existence have
both a conventional and an ultimate nature.
7. “Constructivism” is a label that has been applied to a wide range
of theoretical approaches. As to constructivism’s underlying ontological
assumptions, that is, its assertions about how the things theorized about
ultimately exist, these run the gamut from Alexander Wendt’s so-called
“rump materialism” which he equates with the scientific realist notion
that our ideas ultimately refer to something that is mind independent to
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more post-modern, interpretive constructivism that argues it is impossible
to divorce the seer from the seen and that all reality is mind-dependent,
what is known as philosophical idealism. It should be noted that such
distinctions are complicated by the fact that Wendt’s understanding of
scientific realism differs from how others generally use this term, and, by
the fact that Wendt also refers to himself as an idealist in the same work
in which he claims to be a scientific realist! (see Rivas 2010). Perhaps not
surprisingly, some constructivists (and most realist and liberal scholars)
avoid directly addressing the fundamental ontological foundation for their
theories.
8. The law of karma is a special instance of the law cause and effect which
maintains that all our actions of body, speech, and mind are causes and
all our experiences are their effects. Karma means “action” or “volition”
and refers specifically to the mental intentions that initiate any action.
Ignorance (of the nature of reality) is considered the root mental karmic
cause of human suffering.
9. Buddha did not teach to establish a religion or philosophical school but
to offer others a means to reduce and ultimately eliminate their suffering.
After his enlightenment, Buddha’s first teaching was that of the Four
Noble Truths, and the first of these is that “one must know suffering.”
Human suffering includes manifest forms such as the pains of birth, aging,
sickness, and death. But in addition to encountering those things that
cause us pain, because of our very impermanence, we will also suffer
from being parted from the things we love and the failure to ever fully
satisfy our desires for permanent worldly happiness. Temporary pleasures,
then, are merely transitory relief from our manifest suffering. It is not
that things like family, career, and pleasurable pursuits are not enjoyable;
rather it is the mistaken belief that they can endure that leads to suffering.
Inescapably, realization of our existential dilemma makes all our pleasures
temporary, fleeting, and ultimately in the nature of suffering. More-
over, given the Buddhist teaching of rebirth, one cycles through these
sufferings again and again in one life after another without control or
freedom, what is known in Sanskrit as samsara, or “pervasive suffering.”
The Second Noble Truth reveals the origin of our suffering: namely,
our craving and grasping at self and objects that are impermanent and
unable to provide true happiness. This self-grasping ignorance leads us to
perform innumerable negative actions motivated by anger and attachment.
Further, given the “law of karma” that maintains that all actions have their
similar corresponding effect, our negative actions will necessarily perpet-
uate suffering for us now and in the future. Thankfully, in the Third
Noble Truth, Buddha explains that we can change our negative karma by
good thoughts, words, and deeds leading eventually to a cessation of our
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suffering by abandoning grasping at self and phenomena and awakening
to our true compassionate nature having removed our delusions and come
to understand how things truly exist. In Buddhism, the underlying nature
of our mind is clear, luminous, and discerning (in that it understands the
true nature of reality). With discernment comes liberation for ourselves
and spontaneous compassion for all similarly suffering beings. Ignorance is
a curable disease. We must come to recognize that our reality is imperma-
nent, there is no self and all things are interdependent; failing to recognize
these truths is the source of our dissatisfaction. Lastly, in the Fourth
Noble Truth, Buddha sets out the way to end suffering and achieve a state
beyond sorrow, nirvana, and invites everyone to examine and experience
the effects for themselves. The Eightfold Noble Path is a means to that
end and has three dimensions to it: wisdom (prajñā), mental discipline
(samādhi), and morality (ś̄ıla). The Eightfold Path includes eight stages of
ethical management: (1) right view, (2) right intention, (3) right speech,
(4) right action, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindful-
ness, and (8) right concentration. The elements of the path are offered
as mutually supportive, and at the heart of the matter is wisdom, which
is the realization of the true nature of reality. The path, then, might be
distilled down to practicing moral behavior and concentrating/meditating
on and inculcating virtues to train the mind and lead it to the realization
of wisdom.
10. The concept “Buddha nature” is complex and the subject of inter-
sectarian doctrinal disputes. One debate surrounds the question of
whether “Buddha nature” is best interpreted as a potentiality yet to be
fulfilled or as an actuality as yet unrecognized. Another debate surrounds
the question of how to reconcile the notion of an essential Buddha nature
with the notion of impermanence and emptiness. Both debates draw from
a variety of root texts and have generated extensive commentaries that,
while fascinating, will not be engaged here.
11. Happiness has a meaning in Buddhism that is distinct from the West. This
topic is addressed in Chapter 5.
12. Alexander Wendt calls this integrative approach from the individual level
of analysis through the analysis of the international system of states a
“holistic” approach to IR theory (Wendt 1999).
13. In Western political theory, a realist ontology is the underpinning for a
politics of separateness and fear, captured most artfully in the work of
Thomas Hobbes. By extension, in the international realm, this notion of
separation, insecurity, and violence is supported most strongly by Political
Realists.
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CHAPTER 3
Buddha on Politics, Economics, and Statecraft
Abstract This chapter outlines doctrinal Buddhist political and economic
theory including its notions about interstate relations, which are based on
its unique understanding of the nature of reality. Some readers may be
surprised to hear that there exists a theory of politics in Buddha’s teach-
ings. But in fact, Buddha spoke extensively about politics, contrary to
the assertion of Max Weber who famously asserted that Buddhism was
“a specifically a-political and anti-political status religion.” Although the
overriding goal of Buddha’s teachings is the liberation of individuals from
pervasive suffering, Buddha considered politics as important, not so much
for its intrinsic value, but because it created an external environment that
can facilitate or impede an individual’s pursuit of happiness, defined as
spiritual advancement and achievement of wisdom about the true nature
of oneself and the world. Although best understood as an extension of
his teachings on human liberation, Buddha was also an original social
and a significant political philosopher. Buddha’s social teachings parallel
modern democratic thought, mixed market economics, and cosmopolitan
internationalism in the West. This chapter outlines Buddha’s political
and economic theory, including his thoughts about statecraft and the
possibilities for international order.
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Buddha on Politics1
Early Buddhist literature2 addresses several political, economic, and inter-
national issues. While the primary purpose of Buddha’s teachings is
the liberation of individuals from pervasive suffering, his teachings also
acknowledge the interdependence of the individual with society, polity,
and economy. Buddha’s teachings sought to mediate these relationships
constructively. Although largely unknown in the West, Buddha was an
original and important social, political, and economic philosopher, and a
rationalistic, humanistic, and democratic one at that (Ling 1981).
What are the essential elements of Buddha’s normative vision for
politics? Buddha saw politics not as an end in itself but as an instru-
ment that could either provide favorable conditions or create harmful
obstructions for individuals’ personal advancement. Buddha recognized
that government is necessary to provide social order and welfare and that
its values, content, and processes should be consistent with the “dharma.”
“Dharma” (dhamma in Pāli) has many meanings but here refers to the
teachings of Buddha and their realization, which are offered as universal
or natural laws—such as the law of dependent arising and the suffering
that results from ignorance of this basic truth. These laws are not created
by Buddha, they operate with or without him, but Buddha revealed these
laws and recommended that we examine them and act accordingly; not
through blind faith, but through a process of rational human assessment.3
A political system organized consistent with these basic truths could mini-
mize the manifest forms of suffering for all members of society—especially
for the least fortunate whose visible suffering is greatest—and play a
positive role in an individual’s attainment of higher forms of well-being.
What does it mean to say that political practices must be consistent
with the dharma for their legitimacy? A fundamental principle of the
dharma relevant to politics is the equality and dignity of all individ-
uals. Buddha stressed that all human beings have an inherent worth
and capacity for enlightenment, so-called, “Buddha nature.”4 In contrast
to the prevailing Brahmin teachings, Buddha rejected the caste system
and argued that virtues were distributed equally, not hierarchically, across
society. Buddha states: “Now since both dark and bright qualities, which
are blamed and praised by the wise, are scattered indiscriminately among
the four castes, the wise do not recognize the claim about the Brahmin
caste being the highest … [anyone can] become emancipated … by virtue
of dharma” (DN, 27, 2012 at p. 408). The dharma applies equally
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to everyone regardless of class, social status, or economic circumstance.
Because citizen and ruler alike are equal under the law of dharma, polit-
ical institutions should reflect this basic truth. For it’s time these were
truly groundbreaking social insights.
Buddha’s teachings also reflect the principle of equality when he
prescribes that monarchy, the dominant form of government during
his lifetime, should be based on popular consent (not divine right),
conducted in consultation with the governed, even-handed in the appli-
cation of justice, and conform to the dharma. Democracy, however, is
the form of government where equality is paramount, and Buddha’s
own political creation, the sangha (the order of monks and nuns in Pāli
and Sanskrit), is governed by strict equality in its rules for admission,
participation, administration, and dispute resolution.
Because of the equality and ultimate goodness of every individual
(and because they all suffer), Buddha taught that they are each worthy
of our compassion and, at a minimum, should not be harmed by the
state. Nonviolence or non-harm (ahimsa in Sanskrit and Pāli) is a natural
corollary to Buddha’s teachings on the equality of human potential and
the basis of the protection of individual rights.5 Perhaps the most direct
example of this principle to politics is Buddha’s repeated admonition that
a righteous ruler must follow the ethical precepts of no killing, no stealing,
no lying, etc. More affirmatively, the successful leader must demon-
strate compassion and care through the practices of kindness, equanimity,
patience, and generosity. Nonviolence and equality are the bedrocks of
Buddhist social justice, and good government requires moral and legal
protection against the arbitrary use of power. Buddha, like America’s
founding fathers, was concerned about the danger of tyranny.
The third feature of Buddha’s political teachings is a tolerance for
different political configurations and a pragmatic and non-doctrinaire
(“liberal” or “pluralistic” in this sense) approach to political questions.
Rather than overtly endorsing a particular form of government, Buddha,
in befriending and advising republics and monarchs alike, implies that
good governance can take more than one form but must allow for the
maximization of individual happiness of its citizens (defined in a way
that goes beyond mere sensual enjoyment to include self-realization) and
that minimizes their suffering, allowing them to cultivate compassion,
patience, generosity, meditative concentration, and wisdom while discour-
aging greed, hatred, and ignorance. Buddha did not explicitly advocate for
a single form of government, and, at one level, recognized that different
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types of regimes could be considered legitimate if the spirit of the ruler
and the ruled was in accordance with the dharma.
Nonetheless, Buddha indicated a preference for democratic and repre-
sentative forms of government. In his teachings and prescriptions, Buddha
endorsed democratic principles such as citizen participation and free
expression of opinion; deliberation, consultation, and consensus-building;
voting and respect for popular consent; transparency via face-to-face
meetings and public debate; primacy of the rule of law and limited
government. We see these predilections in Buddha’s endorsement of
republican principles in the sūtras and the incorporation of democratic
principles into the rules governing Buddha’s own society of monks and
nuns in the vinaya. Buddha’s teachings are directly relevant to contem-
porary politics and are compatible with the governance of a modern
democratic state. Buddha’s political thinking parallels Western liberal-
democratic thought with its emphasis on equal rights, protection against
tyranny via equality before the law, and participatory and deliberative
governance.
The most important distinction between “dharmic” democracy and
Western liberal democracy is Buddhism’s emphasis on one’s individual
duties to others as much as one’s individual rights, duties that exceed
compliance with the law. Where liberal democracy has little to say about
the moral qualities of what constitutes good governance beyond the
values of equality of opportunity and protection of individual choice
and instead focuses on the process of good governance not the substance
(Garfield 2001), “dharmic democracy” delineates a clear duty of care
owed to others and to the natural world as well. Fundamentally, in
dharmic democracy individuals have a duty not only to avoid abridging
other’s freedoms, but to strive to develop a sense of universal responsi-
bility and concern for all human beings and the natural world. Although
this duty is everyone’s responsibility, political institutions and their leaders
should reflect these principles, and policy should encourage their inculca-
tion and practice. The emphasis on responsibilities as well as rights follows
directly from Buddhism’s underlying ontology of dependent origination
and a theory of causation that maintains our lives are not separate but
deeply interdependent. Contemporary Buddhist writer and monk, Thich
Nhat Hanh, captured this difference in the context of the United States
when he remarked: “We have the Statute of Liberty on the East Coast. I
think we have to make a Statute of Responsibility on the West Coast to
counterbalance Liberty. Liberty without responsibility is not real liberty”
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(Hanh 2006 at p. 137). “Freedom” in Buddhist thought means freedom
from the chains of self-grasping ignorance, not the unbridled pursuit of
“self” interest.
Buddha on Economics
Just as Buddha had important things to say about politics, he
offered numerous profound and practical insights on economic matters
throughout the sūtras. These teachings provide guidance on how spiritual
advancement and material well-being could be compatible and mutually
supportive.
The purpose of economic activity in Buddhism is to provide the
necessary material basis for individuals to enjoy a comfortable life, thus
freeing them to pursue higher forms of well-being. Production, consump-
tion, and distribution of material goods should reduce suffering and
provide sustainable welfare and dignified work for all members of society
through the wise use of scarce resources. This view of economic activity
as a means toward higher ends contrasts with classical or neoclassical
Western economics where the focus is on material well-being alone and
production, consumption, and distribution are designed to maximize
an individual’s “utility” or “welfare” through ever-increasing material
production and consumption, in the aggregate, to grow Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), under resource constraints.
Like politics, Buddhism treats economic life as part of living in accor-
dance with the dharma and therefore views it as part of a larger ethical
framework from which it cannot be separated.6 By virtue of the doctrine
of radical interdependence, economic activity is necessarily part of a
larger whole, an important part, but only a part, and it must be kept in
harmony with familial, social, environmental, and spiritual aspects of life.
In Buddhist economics, there are no “externalities.” Economic progress,
for oneself or society, is not an end in itself but part of broader process
of personal and social advancement.
Nonetheless, Buddha warned against ignoring physical needs and
eschewing material pursuits, and recommended balanced progress in
material and spiritual well-being—a so-called “Middle Way” between
physically destructive asceticism and soul-crushing material indulgence
as the way to happiness. The goal of Buddhist economics is to provide
material security and economic stability for individuals and society and
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sustainable growth. The state must guarantee the physical needs of indi-
viduals in the form of the “four essentials”: food, clothing, shelter, and
medicine, as these constitute the foundation for other pursuits such as
moral development and the acquisition of wisdom.
Buddha’s economic teachings are not anti-wealth. He taught that no
suffering arises from experiencing or enjoying objects of the senses. The
problem with material wealth arises from our pervasive delusion that
misapprehends the real nature of phenomena in our samsaric existence
as discussed in Chapter 2. That is, we forget the impermanent nature
of material pleasures and are misled into thinking they are a true source
of lasting happiness. It is our craving and grasping at evanescent objects
(and ourselves) based on fear, greed, and the underlying ignorance of the
nature of reality that leads to suffering. The problem lies neither with
the objects of the senses nor the enjoyment derived from them, but from
misperception of their impermanent nature and the pursuit of material
objects as the supreme source of happiness for a self that also ultimately
does not exist. Wealth, then, does not stand in the way of liberation, but
the attachment to wealth does.
For laypeople, Buddha recommended the acquisition of wealth and
material prosperity through industry, frugality, entrepreneurship, and
resourcefulness, but he also advocated for values such as concern and
care for others, non-harm, generosity, and, eventually, nonattachment to
wealth given its impermanence and inability to provide lasting happiness.
To be nonattached “is to possess and use material things but not be
possessed or used by them” (Sizemore and Swearer 1993 at p. 1).
Consumption, like wealth, is not discouraged by Buddha, but one
should remain mindful of its associated risks.7 Because humankind has
virtually unlimited desires, Buddha encouraged moderation in consump-
tion that can distinguish material needs and wants.8 As guidance in
making this distinction between needs and wants, Buddha listed the
following things money should be spent on: food, clothing, and shelter;
attending to parents; treating relatives and guests; alms in memory of the
departed; religious offerings; and payments to the state (AN, 3:45, 2012).
In short, for individuals, Buddha advised a balanced life, free from
the sufferings of both poverty and indulgence and guided by wisdom,
discernment, and right view. This approach can lead to a deeper sense
of contentment, which Buddha said is “the highest form of wealth”
(Dhp. 204, 2007). In Buddhism, it is one’s attitudes and actions about
wealth, not the level of wealth, that is important. Nonattachment is the
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appropriate attitude toward wealth, which can be cultivated by acquiring
wealth through righteous means, consuming it with moderation, and
developing contentment and sharing wealth generously, but wisely (SN,
99, 2000).
For the state, poverty is the primary threat to individual and soci-
etal advancement and providing sufficiency in the four material requisites
for all is the first purpose of a political-economic system. Both the indi-
vidual and the state have a duty to protect and promote the welfare of
all citizens. For the individual, this duty of care for others flows from
the development of higher states of mind such as generosity and compas-
sion and an appreciation for the equality and dignity of all human beings.
But charity alone will not fully address the problem. The challenge of
poverty must be dealt with systematically, necessarily involving govern-
ment policy that can fully utilize the productive resources of society (DN,
5, 2012). If the state fails to care for its citizens it could lose its legiti-
macy and create social pathologies and unrest. The state must also prevent
economic injustice, eliminate corruption, and protect the environment
and consumers from exploitation. Thus, Buddha’s teaching envisions a
somewhat greater role for the state in economic affairs than in most tradi-
tional liberal economic models, but his prescription is not too different
from the welfare liberalism found in many advanced market economies.
As for the private sector, Buddha acknowledges that possession of
private property by the laity is a pragmatic response to our egocen-
tric tendencies and an efficient means for creating incentives for work
and productivity (DN, 27, 2012).9 He recognized commerce and
profitmaking as legitimate and necessary economic activities. Buddhist
economics is in no way anti-business. The sūtras encourage economic
freedom and entrepreneurship if pursued righteously, without harm to
others, and without excessive greed. At various points throughout the
canon, Buddha encourages business people to be energetic, mindful, pure
in deed, self-controlled, considerate, right living, and heedful. Indeed, the
merchant classes were among the first proponents of Buddhist philos-
ophy and carried Buddhism throughout Asia. Traders are advised to
act with wisdom, acumen, and reliability and should know what is an
appropriate profit margin for their goods (AN, 1:116, 2012). Profits are
essential and necessary if they are obtained honestly and without fraud or
cheating. Business people are encouraged to work hard and avoid lazi-
ness and managerial efficiency is praised. One writer described the tenor
of Buddha’s economic advice contained in the sūtras as “unmistakably
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bourgeois” (Reynolds 1993 at p. 71), another as reflecting “merchant
type” values (Ornatowski 1996 at p. 206). Profitmaking should not be
the only concern of producers and traders, however, as they have respon-
sibilities to their employees,10 society, and the natural world too. And
trading in certain goods is explicitly prohibited, namely trade in weapons,
living beings (slave trade), butchering, intoxicants, and poisons (AN, III:
209, 2012).
With regard to the relationship between economic activity and the
environment, Buddha was one of the first thinkers to advocate for
environmentally sustainable economics as an essential social principle.
Because of our deep interdependence and our ethical responsibilities,
which extend beyond humans to all sentient beings and the natural world
in this and future lives, Buddha advised maintaining a proper relationship
between productive activities and the environment. Buddha asserted that
in amassing wealth humankind must treat nature as a bee collects pollen in
that the bee harms neither the beauty of the flower nor its fragrance and
ensures its future fruition. Analogously, economic production must not
harm the natural environment or impair the well-being of future genera-
tions by destroying nature’s regenerative powers or its beauty (Dhp. 2007
at p. 49). Buddhism does not view the environment as a divine creation
for human exploitation, nor is it seen as “external” to the production
process. It too must be treated with care and without harm as humans
and nature are interdependent.
Buddhist economics differs from dominant Western models in several
important dimensions and yet is not fundamentally estranged from
Western thinking. At a fundamental level, the most important difference
is that whereas liberal market economics view the material world as real
and permanent and the source of happiness, in Buddhist economics mate-
rial reality is seen as impermanent, and if treated wisely, as the source of
lesser happiness and prerequisite to higher forms of well-being. Liberal
economics is concerned with satisfying the ever-expanding needs and
wants of the self, and Buddhist economics is a means to assist indi-
viduals in transcending the self and controlling the negative emotions
underlying our untamed desires through the development of moder-
ation, contentment, and wisdom (of the nature of reality). Buddha’s
approach emphasizes right view: understanding the true nature of our
existence, and right livelihood, working, acquiring wealth, and consuming
consistently with this view. With right view, one recognizes the ultimate
impermanence and insubstantiality of ourselves and all phenomena and
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understands that material things are not the source of true happiness and
that clinging to them will only perpetuate our suffering. Finally, from a
Buddhist perspective, it follows that increasing output and consumption
is not necessarily an accurate measure of improvements in the well-being
of society or its members. Measuring societal well-being as synonymous
with the expansion of GDP is flawed and must be replaced with more
holistic metrics that consider a much broader range of factors important
to human flourishing and that examine the quality and sustainability of
growth. Many international organizations are moving in this direction,11
and in Chapter 5 we will see the application of these economic principles
in Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness (GNH) development policies.
Like Buddha’s thoughts on politics, his economic teachings do not
mandate a single economic system, but are broadly compatible with a
modern, mixed market economy. By mixed market, I mean the belief
that while markets do many things well, they are not the answer to all
economic problems, and that the government has some responsibility to
uphold in the economic sphere societal values that exceed liberty and legal
competition to include a duty of care for others and the environment.
So, despite the differences between Buddhist and liberal economics,
these approaches have much in common and a meaningful discussion is
possible between the two philosophies regarding important contempo-
rary economic issues such as poverty and income inequality, sustainability,
business–government relations, and the role of the state among others
(Daniels 2005). Importantly, both Buddhist economics and liberal market
capitalism share a rational and pragmatic approach to economic issues
that recognizes a role both for the public and private sector. Much like
Buddha on politics, Buddhist economics is not doctrinaire and suggests
that economic systems must be flexible and culturally appropriate for a
particular time and place (Welford 2007). This adaptability also opens
the door to a consideration of the possible contemporary relevance of
Buddha’s economic teachings to modern life.
Buddha on International Relations and Statecraft
The Buddhist conception of politics as serving the common good extends
to the international realm where our humanity and fundamental interde-
pendence ultimately transcend national, racial, and other barriers, which
are, at most, only conventional distinctions. This is not to say that
the state must wither away in Buddhism. States, like our conventional
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designation of our “selves” as distinctive individual entities, can func-
tion effectively as long as one recognizes their nominal, transactional,
and dependent nature and avoids grasping at them as inherently real.
States can serve an important function by equitably supplying public
goods. Likewise, a system of such like-minded states can “exist” and func-
tion effectively, if one recognizes and does not lose sight of the deeper,
interconnected nature of all things.
Thus, Buddhist statecraft is an international extension of Buddhist
political and economic principles of equality, harmony, social welfare,
nonviolence, conciliation, and mutually beneficial commercial exchange
what has been summed up above as ruling in accord with the dharma,
sometimes called “righteousness” in the Buddhist cannon.12 Buddha
discusses statecraft mostly in parables,13 introducing the concept of
world-ruler (cakkavatti in Pali, cakravartin in Sanskrit), who would
provide exemplary leadership for states in the international system. The
cakkavatti is a lesser or worldly Buddha that provides for the material
welfare (more than the spiritual welfare) of mankind.14 By example and
generosity (not violent conquest), this ruler (either a single individual or
a representative body) establishes an ideal government with the consent
of the governed which is followed by a series of similar democratic and
constitutional states based on shared principles. This loose network of
ideal states would constitute an international political system that served
the interests of worldwide peace and prosperity. One can see certain
parallels here with Kant’s vision of perpetual peace among like-minded
representative states and with democratic peace theory and notions of
an “international society” and cosmopolitanism in modern Western IR
writings.
Buddhist IR begins with the establishment of a righteous state, ruled
by consent of the governed with policies consistent with the dharma.
This government would work for the interest of its people with care,
impartial justice, tolerance, and the equal promotion of material and spir-
itual welfare of society’s members. In modern parlance, the exemplar
would be an enlightened democratic welfare state guaranteeing freedom
and economic security and promoting equality, tolerance, and care for
its citizens (Jayatilleke 1967). In time, this model would extend natu-
rally and infectiously or “travel” to other parts of the world, via the
Buddhist metaphor of a rolling “Wheel of Dharma,” much like Buddha’s
initial teaching after his enlightenment set in motion a wheel of spiritual
guidance. These other countries, in turn, would establish similar states
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with analogous governing principles and constitutions. The international
system would not be centralized empire, but a loose constellation of states
revolving around an archetypal entity (Tambiah 1976).
In relating with other states, hostility and aggression is forbidden and
the cultivation of friendliness and neighborliness and mutually beneficial
commerce is endorsed, both to conform with the dharma and on grounds
of expediency and efficacy, that is, aggression does not serve one’s self-
interest in the long run. Buddha counseled, “Hatred never ceases by
hatred in this world. Hatred ceases by love—this is the ancient law” (Dhp.
2007 at p. 105).15 A state could retain its army for defensive purposes
but nonviolence is thought to be the higher ideal and Buddha counseled
against the resort to war as a means of settling international disputes (King
2013).16 The first ethical principle in Buddhism is to refrain from killing
or injuring any sentient being. There is little or no support for “just war”
in Buddhism (Jerryson 2013; Jayasuriya 2009). Buddha said that wars
only perpetuate future conflict. As noted, he also spoke out against the
trading in weapons as “wrong livelihood.”
In sum, in foreign affairs, the state has the obligation not to commit
aggression and to cooperate with other states in a spirit of friendliness and
equality for the common good of mankind. Like all Buddha’s advice, this
admonition was offered for its practical benefits—it strengthened both
the individual state and encouraged common bond of humanity that
would bear fruit in international peace and prosperity. Buddha’s polit-
ical doctrine of equality, democracy, popular sovereignty, and political
institutions that serve the common good materially and spiritually find
their ultimate fulfillment in a worldwide network of states each acting
according to these principles. Hence, in Buddhism, states may exist, but
they are artifacts that endure for the benefit of a broader humanity.
Empirical Referents for Buddhist Statecraft:
Aśoka’s Mauryan Empire and Contemporary Bhutan
Buddhism has shaped many cultures throughout Asia and, more recently,
has become influential in the West. Buddhism’s political impact has been
more muted, however, in part, because from the start the Buddhist order,
the democratic sangha, was to remain apart, although not wholly sepa-
rate, from politics.17 The devoted practitioners of the sangha were to
be considered a source of advice and example to the wider society and
polity, but refrain from participating directly in the political process. So,
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there are few instances where one can find an empirical example of a
political system founded truly on Buddhist principles or practicing what
might be called Buddhist statecraft. This is not to say that Buddhism
has not been used by politicians past and present to cloak their actions
in Buddhist rhetoric, much as other religious traditions have been used,
only that an authentic effort to align Buddhist principles with political
practice is quite rare. I offer two possible cases of Buddhist statecraft—
one ancient and one modern (an alpha and omega)—for consideration.
The ancient case is the Mauryan Empire of King Aśoka, the first ruler
of a Buddhist state, and the modern case is contemporary Bhutan—the
only extant example of a democratic state that is rooted constitutionally,
politically, and economically in Buddhism.18
Notes
1. Portions of this discussion are taken from the author’s earlier work,
Tantric State: A Buddhist Approach to Democracy and Development in
Bhutan, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
2. The discussion of Buddhist political and economic principles presented
here is drawn from several well-known sūtras that bear on polit-
ical or social matters and from the vinaya. These sūtras include the:
Mahāparinibbān. a, Aggañña, Mahāsudassana, Cakkavatti-S̄ıhanāda, and
Kūt.adanta. For purposes of names, I use the Pāli language names as they
appear in the translated canon.
3. God-given laws or commandments do not exist in Buddhism, only vows
people take for their own well-being to assist them with their spiri-
tual advancement. Vows are the acknowledgment of naturalistic facts
about how the universe operates. In this sense, Buddhist ethical recom-
mendations are often described as “conditional,” “hypothetical,” or
“non-categorical,” although these characterizations of Buddhist ethics are
the subject of much debate (Moore 2016).
4. Buddhism, particularly the branch known as Mahayana Buddhism, main-
tains that humans and all other sentient beings possess Buddha nature.
As noted, the concept “Buddha nature” is complex and the topic of
inter-sectarian doctrinal dispute. For our purposes, the basic idea is that
all individuals possess the essence of the Buddha’s enlightenment, which
forms the basis for all positive qualities. These qualities are not states of
mind to be added; they are already fully present but obscured by grasping
at an inherent self, dualism, and other misconceptions that flow from this
misunderstanding of reality.
5. On Buddhism and human rights see Damien Keown (2000).
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6. Buddha’s economic ideas are firmly rooted in his first teachings on the
Four Noble Truths: the truth of suffering, the causes of suffering, the
cessation of suffering, and the path that leads to cessation of suffering.
The “path” is known as the Noble Eightfold Path and the fifth step of
that path, “Right Livelihood,” is the material dimension of the moral
practice necessary to achieve enlightenment.
7. Because wealth often produces craving, attachment, jealousy, and other
unhealthy minds, Buddha advises worldly people to develop four qualities
that will protect them from developing negative attitudes toward wealth
and its use, namely: (1) confidence in the law of karma; (2) morality
or virtue; (3) generosity; and (4) discernment (as to the true nature of
reality) (AN 4:284, 2012). Developing these qualities will inoculate one
from the potential dangers associated with wealth.
8. Regarding our desires, Buddha remarked: “Even a shower of gold cannot
quench the passions” (Dhp. 186, 2007).
9. In contrast, common property and a conscious decision to not engage in
the material world is recommended only for those few who make a volun-
tary commitment to withdraw from productive economic activity to strive
vigorously for nonattachment (although overcoming craving for wealth is
a chief obstacle to enlightenment for both laity and the ordained). The
monastic orientation toward wealth is not expected of, or recommended
to, the laity. Indeed, the intense pursuit of spiritual advancement leading
to the foregoing of productive economic activity and the virtual elimi-
nation of private property by the ordained would not be possible unless
the laity followed a different economic model that included economic
productivity, private property, and growth sufficient to create a surplus
from economic activity that could sustain the materially nonproductive
sangha.
10. The Sigalovada Suttra explains what constitutes appropriate employer–
employee relations. An employer has five duties that must be fulfilled
toward an employee: (1) assignment of work in accordance with the capa-
bility of the employee; (2) provision of food and wages; (3) provision of
medical care (benefits); (4) sharing of windfalls (today what we might call
offering bonuses or profit sharing); and (5) granting leave and vacation at
the proper times. Employees, in turn, owe their employer the following: to
(1) rise early; (2) go to bed late; (3) refrain from stealing; (4) discharge
their duties well; and (5) speak well of their employer. Fulfilling these
mutual responsibilities will lead to increased output and productivity (DN,
31, 2012).
11. Emerging trends in scholarship and policy focus less on GDP and increas-
ingly on alternative and expanded measurements of national progress such
as the United Nation’s Human Development Index and its Sustainability
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Goals, the Happy Planet Index, the Genuine Progress Indicator, the Orga-
nization for Cooperation and Development’s Better Life Index, and others
(Brown 2017).
12. U.N. Ghoshal called the “total application of the principle of righteous-
ness” to politics “the most important contribution of the early Buddhists
canonists to the store of our ancient political thought” (Ghoshal 1959 at
p. 69).
13. Buddha, using skillful means, offers guidance on how to promote
harmonious social relations through parables, rather than through direct
recommendations to an actual monarch, as that would have been inappro-
priate, ineffective, and dangerous (Chakravarti 1987). Given the growth
in monarchies during Buddha’s lifetime and their aggressive ambitions
and violent methods, compromise and accommodation with this form of
government was unavoidable, and ameliorating extreme forms of royal
despotism by instructive parables was an adroit method of indirectly
advising kings and humanizing and constraining the worst excesses of
monarchy. If Buddha did not prescribe a vision of international relations
in greater detail, keep in mind this was not his primary task and one can
look to his detailed directions in the vinaya, instructions for the sangha,
for more specific guidance on political administration.
14. See the Cakkavattisihanada sūtra D.N. 26 and Mahasudassana sūtra
D.N. 17 (2012).
15. The quotation continues, “Victory breeds hatred: the vanquished live
in sorrow. The peaceful ones live in harmony giving up both victory
and defeat. Conquer enmity with amity, evil with good, miserliness with
charity, and falsehood with truth” (Dhp. 2007).
16. See Buddha’s advice to the Sākya and Koliya tribes who stood on the
threshold of war over contested water rights (Jayatillake 2008).
17. In Indian society during Buddha’s lifetime and immediately afterward, the
relationship was conceived as a triangle among the state, the sangha, and
the laity. Society and government supported the sangha materially, and the
sangha, in turn, legitimated and counseled the government and educated
and modeled the dharma for the laity. This triangular relationship was
adopted by other Buddhist Asian societies, such as Burma/Myanmar
(Walton 2012).
18. Buddhist comprise about two-thirds to three quarters of the Bhutanese
population and the constitution provides that the King is both head of
state and protector of the Buddhist faith and culture. Buddhism is not
explicitly the state religion, but it is strongly emphasized in Bhutan’s
constitution and institutions. For a comprehensive discussion of the
Bhutanese political and economic system in theory and practice and its
relationship to Buddhism see Lee (2014), Long (2019).
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Abstract This chapter introduces the first case study that serves
as empirical referent for a Buddhist approach to statecraft in ancient
times by considering the early kingdom of Aśoka. This chapter and the
one that follows offer “proofs of concept” for the possibility of applying
Buddhist ideas in the practice of politics and statecraft. Aśoka governed
according to the dharma, meaning principles and policies that reflect
Buddha’s teachings, although Aśoka expressed his principles and poli-
cies in edicts written in nonreligious, nonexclusive language. Aśoka’s
rule was characterized by the promotion of nonviolence; social welfare;
environmental protection; religious tolerance; political pluralism; the fair
and compassionate administration of justice; and sound and responsive
public administration meaning transparency, accessibility, impartiality, and
accountability. His foreign policy was founded on principles of nonvio-
lence, nonaggression, conciliation, stability, and improved understanding
among international actors through diplomacy and mutually beneficial
commerce. Aśoka even practiced the exercise of “soft power” by estab-
lishing medical facilities in foreign lands, sharing beneficial plants, and
installing infrastructure beyond his immediate borders as acts of good-
will toward neighboring countries. While these governing principles and
policies may be commonplace today, Aśoka, it should be remembered,
governed in Asia in the third century B.C.E.
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Who Was Aśoka?
Historians generally consider Aśoka (c. 304–232 BCE) to be the paradig-
matic leader who governed according to Buddhist principles and the
closest approximation to the mythic cakkavatti discussed in Chapter 3.1
In the West, he is most famously memorialized by H.G. Wells, who wrote:
Aśoka worked sanely for the real needs of men. Amidst the tens of
thousands
of names of monarchs that crowd the columns of history, their majesties
and graciousnesses, and serenities and royal highnesses and the like, the
name of
Aśoka shines, and shines almost alone, a star. From the Volga to Japan,
his
name is still honored. … More living men cherish his memory today
than
ever have heard the names Constantine and Charlemagne (Wells 1921
at p. 371).
He is similarly heralded in ancient Indian, Sri Lankan, and Chinese
legends. Separating the historical Aśoka from the legend, however, can
be difficult.
We know that Aśoka was the grandson of Chandragupta Maurya
(reign: 321–298 BCE). Chandragupta founded the Mauryan dynasty
and was the patron of the great Indian political theoretician, Kautilya,
who authored an early treatise on power and politics, the Arthaśhāstra.
After an interregnum following the death of his father, Bindusara (reign
circa: 297–273 BCE), Aśoka successfully prevailed over his brothers in
a competition for the throne, and Aśoka assumed authority circa 269
BCE. Aśoka brought the Mauryan dynasty to its apogee and ruled virtu-
ally the entire Indian subcontinent (today, most of India, and much of
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan) as a hegemonic power for nearly
40 years. His reign was a unique period of peace, unity, and prosperity on
the subcontinent (Fig. 4.1).
Although extolled in ancient legends of the East,2 Aśoka is best under-
stood through his own words, his “Edicts,” 33 in all, which were etched
in rocks, stone pillars, and other materials and posted throughout his
empire during his lifetime (Basham 1982).3 For nearly two millennia,
the messages of the Edicts were lost to history because they were written
primarily in Brahmi, a language that became extinct within a few centuries
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Fig. 4.1 India in 250 B.C. (From “Historical Atlas of India,” by Charles
Joppen [London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907], scan by FWP, Oct. 2006)
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of Aśoka’s death. Eventually, the linguistic code was broken in the mid-
nineteenth century, and since that time, the Edicts have been accepted as
the standard for interpreting Aśokan politics (Tharpar 1997). Although
one thinks of an edict as a sovereign’s statement with the force of law,
Aśoka’s Edicts also included exhortations and persuasive writings and
declarations of Aśoka’s “devotion to the dharma,” a phrase that has two
intertwined meanings that will be explained below. Aśoka had three audi-
ences for his edicts: most directly, his ministers; indirectly, all those people
under his rule; and ultimately, posterity (Singh 2012).
Aśoka’s Reign
Following the consolidation of his empire through military conquest over
the eastern kingdom of Kalinga (modern Orissa) eight years into his
reign, Aśoka underwent a spiritual transformation, a metanoia or moral
revolution. Reflecting that moral reckoning, Aśoka described in his own
poignant words in Rock Edict XIII the great remorse he felt for the
carnage, suffering, and displacement caused by his military campaign
against the Kalingas4:
When he had been consecrated eight years the Beloved of the Gods, the
king Piyadasi [Aśoka], conquered Kalinga. A hundred and fifty thousand
people
were deported, a hundred thousand killed and many times that number
perished… On conquering Kalinga the Beloved of the Gods felt
remorse…
the slaughter, death, and deportation of the people weighs heavily on
the
mind of the Beloved of the Gods.
The experience marked an inflection point in his governance.
Aśoka henceforth dedicated his rule to the principles of charity and
nonviolence, designed to serve his subjects and all living beings. He
committed himself to rule according to the dharma in the First Pillar
Edict, “For this is my principle: to protect through dharma, to admin-
ister affairs through dharma, to please the people with dharma, to guard
the empire through dharma.”
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Two Notions of Dharma: Buddha Dharma and Aśokan Dharma
In the Rock Edict I, thought to be the oldest edict, Aśoka discusses
his conversion to Buddhism.5 Aśoka states in Minor Edict I at Bairat-
Calcutta (Bhabra) that he became a lay devotee (upāsaka) dedicated to
Buddha, the dharma (Buddha’s teachings), and the sangha—the three
“gems.” One’s commitment to the three gems constitutes the gateway to
Buddhism. Aśoka describes how his practice of Buddhism strengthened
three years after his conversion when he spent a year as a layman monk
affiliated with the Buddhist sangha. His faith continued to strengthen
over the course of his reign. Late in his life, he went so far as to
issue a proclamation against those who might promote schisms with
the Buddhist sangha6 and specify several Buddhist scriptures with which
all Buddhist practitioners should be acquainted. Although Aśoka was a
devout practitioner of Buddha’s dharma personally; for example, he made
highly visible pilgrimages to Buddhist holy places, erected shrines, and
donated to Buddhist monasteries, he did not seek to make Buddhism
the state religion, convert his subjects or others outside his kingdom
to Buddhism, or discriminate against those who did not practice the
Buddhist faith. In the Edicts, he rarely directly referred to Buddha’s
teachings, spoke in universal, humanistic terms, and promoted explicitly
ecumenical policies toward all religions.
The contrast between Aśoka’s strong personal beliefs and his nonsec-
tarian policies, universalistic prose, and the general absence of theology
or philosophy in the Edicts raises two critical questions. First, one may
wonder, therefore, what Aśoka meant when he said his rule is dedicated to
the propagation of “dharma.” How was Aśoka using this term? Second, it
prompts the question: “Was Aśoka a ruler who happened to be Buddhist,
or was he a ‘Buddhist ruler,’ that is, one who governed according to
Buddhist principles, even though he was genuinely nonsectarian and even-
handed in his rule and did not use his religion explicitly as a source of
authority and legitimacy?” On this second question, scholars express a
range of opinions.7 This author concludes that Aśoka was a Buddhist
ruler, acting on Buddhist principles, although he usually presented them
shorn of any explicit religious trappings.
Returning to the first question—what did Aśoka mean when he said
he governs according to the dharma? Here, it is essential to begin the
answer at the source, Aśoka himself. In the Second Pillar Edict, Aśoka
poses the question, “What is dharma?” His answer: “To abstain from
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unwholesome deeds, to perform wholesome deeds, compassion, dona-
tion [generosity], truth, and purity [of mind].” In offering this definition
note that, although Aśoka uses the same word, “dharma,” that is often
applied to Buddha’s teachings, dharma has many meanings and in this
context he was not referring to religious doctrine, per se. Aśoka’s dharma
was not preaching the way to Nirvana (he never uses that term in his
Edicts) or teaching Buddha’s Four Noble Truths,8 which is Buddha’s
dharma. Instead, he used the term to mean the worldly dharma of a
cakkavatti; a humanistic civic doctrine based on common ethical prin-
ciples contained in Buddhism (and in many other religions) that Aśoka
believed would provide a practical and unifying standard of behavior for
his heterogeneous empire, one conducive to prosperity, peace, and virtue.
This interpretation is the more general meaning of the word “dharma,”
that is: “law, duty, justice, righteousness, virtue, the social or moral order;
the unity of life” (Dhp. 2007 at p. 256).
Does Aśoka’s use of dharma in this broader sense suggest that he
was not a Buddhist ruler, but rather a worldly ruler who personally
practiced Buddhism? I would answer, “no.” Aśoka, by emphasizing the
universal, nonsectarian, and practical value of his governing principles,
was nonetheless acting consistent with Buddha’s message and methods.
Aśoka’s emphasis on instructing on common truths that are practically
useful parallels Buddha’s approach to teaching his spiritual dharma. When
Buddha was asked by an unlettered woman, “What is Dharma?” He
replies, exactly like Aśoka’s advice to his lay citizens: “To perform all
wholesome deeds and to abstain from all unwholesome deeds and to
continuously strive to purify one’s mind is the dharma” (Dhp. 2007,
p. 183). Buddha recognized that in teaching his dharma he should
start with the universal and practical dimensions of his instructions.
Buddha, like Aśoka, understood that what is most important to teach
is not particular religious doctrine, specific rituals, or arcane philosophy,
but fundamental ethical principles that will be helpful to all individ-
uals right now and in the future. When asked why he did not teach all
that he knows, such as answers to life’s philosophical dilemmas, Buddha
explained, “What do I not teach? Whatever is fascinating to discuss,
divides people against each other, but has no bearing on putting an end
to sorrow. What do I teach? Only what is necessary to take you to the
other shore” (Dhp. 2007 at p. 58). Buddha, like Aśoka, was a pragmatic
humanist; he did not speak of gods. Instead, he offered practical solutions
to human problems in a way that would lead to lasting peace of mind.
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This down-to-earth orientation is especially evident in the early transla-
tion of Buddha’s teachings in the Pāli Canon. Perhaps the most famous
illustration of Buddha’s preference for focusing on practical problems is
found in the Cūla-Māluṅkyaputta sūtra, wherein Buddha eschews meta-
physical speculations for their own sake through the parable of a man shot
with a poisonous arrow who would die while demanding answers about
the caste, clan, color, size, and hometown of his assailant before focusing
on the need to have a physician remove the arrow (MN, 63, 1995)! So,
too, Buddha said people should not waste time in metaphysical wonder-
ings at the expense of failing to put his practical teachings on ending
human suffering into practice. Aśoka, in promoting his worldly dharma,
both within his empire and beyond, took his cue from Buddha and
focused primarily on extolling ethical fundamentals designed to improve
the personal growth and societal well-being of people, rather than the
formal or metaphysical dimensions of his Buddhist religion. Aśoka, in his
Edicts, chose to teach his citizens the aspects of the Buddhist path that
are essential and immediately relevant to the creation and maintenance of
a just and virtuous civic life (not the other shore of Nirvana), and he left
out of his messages anything (including any aspects of his personal reli-
gious beliefs) that could divide his people or be interpreted as sectarian
or exclusionary.
Consistent with his broad approach to dharma, in Pillar Edicts II
and VII, Aśoka emphasizes the personal traits one should inculcate:
goodness, little defilement, mercy, generosity, liberality, truthfulness,
and gentleness. These qualities should be developed in fulfilling one’s
worldly duties to others including: respectful, reverential relationships
with parents, elders, and teachers; liberality with friends, acquaintances,
and relatives; appropriateness with slaves and servants; and protection for
all living creatures. Those familiar with the Buddhist canon will recognize
these instructions as directly parallel to those given by Buddha in the
Sigālovāda sūtra, but Aśoka makes no such reference to it in his Edicts.
Likewise, in Rock Edict III, he encourages moderation in consumption
and expenditure and care regarding one’s speech. In Pillar Edict III he
warns against malevolent attitudes such as impetuosity, cruelty, anger,
pride, and malice. All these admonitions were consistent with Buddha’s
emphasis on the inculcation of basic virtues and positive emotions, the
development of contentment, the practice of restraint, and the pursuit
of the Middle Way, but Aśoka presents them as secular guidelines wholly
apart from any specific, and thus exclusionary, religious mooring. Instead,
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Aśoka sought to personally embody and exemplify these qualities for
his citizens, much like the virtuous ruler, the dharma-raja, in Buddhist
parables, but Aśoka did not use religion as the basis of his authority or
legitimacy. To put it simply, Aśoka knew that it was more efficacious to
“act like a Buddha” than to “act like a Buddhist.” So, in this author’s
interpretation, Aśoka was very much a Buddhist ruler, not just a ruler
who was a Buddhist. I discuss below how many Aśokan policies comport
with specific dimensions of Buddha’s teachings.
While clearly animated by Buddhism, Aśokan dharma was nonsectarian
and inclusive in its presentation. We might today call it a form of secular
ethics. For Aśoka, dharma was the designation of ethical principles with
a unifying and broad appeal to a wide swath of his citizens and a prac-
tical means of conforming behavior in the empire through the creation of
a civic culture. Aśoka’s dharma infused universal ideals—respect for the
sanctity of all life, equality, charity, and compassion—into the everyday
practice of citizens in a multicultural, multiethnic empire. He did not use
religion cynically, but as a true believer, he identified and employed the
universal principles of his religion to connect with all his subjects. This
approach was consistent with Buddha’s use of “skillful means” (upāya-
kauśalya): adapting one’s teachings to the level of the audience’s ability
to understand the dharma, their spiritual potential.
For Aśoka, the essential instrument for inculcation of the dharma was
not state policy or legislation but self-examination, introspection, or what
we might today call mindfulness, contemplation, and meditation. Aśoka
sought to elevate the ethical practice of citizens, not through an exercise
of coercive political power or statute (although he used these too, for
example outlawing ritualistic animal sacrifice), but through encouraging
personal insight and meditation and by insuring that his government
supported citizens in these efforts through good governance, sound and
responsive administration, public works, social welfare, and transparency
and equality under the law (Pillar Edict II). In Pillar Edict VII, he notes,
“of these two [legislation and moral suasion], pious regulations are of
small account, whereas persuasion is of greater value.” This belief in the
supportive role of government for citizen’s personal development is also
fully consistent with Buddha’s political teachings: real change must come
from within, and the government’s and society’s role should support indi-
viduals in these pursuits by providing conducive conditions for personal
advancement and by demonstrating virtue in its policies and administra-
tion. For example, as will be discussed below, peace was a central tenet of
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Aśoka’s rule. In Aśoka’s dialect and in Sanskrit the word for peace, śānti,
means “calming of one’s own mind and the suppression of one’s own
mental and spiritual deficiencies and negative inclinations” rather than the
Western reference to the absence of large-scale political violence (Salomon
2007 at p. 57). In Buddha’s teachings, one cannot meaningfully change
the world and create peace until one has mastered his or her own mind.
Although there is no substitute for personal effort, there is a close connec-
tion between individuals’ pursuit of the dharma and the goals of the state.
They are mutually reinforcing: personal cultivation improves the larger
society, and appropriate social, political, and economic policies of the
state, in turn, support individuals in their personal development. Aśoka
praised both personal and official efforts designed to create this inte-
grated moral and political order. In their translation of the Edicts, Nikam
and McKeon conclude that Aśoka’s dharma “provides a code of personal
conduct, a bond of human relations and political justice and a principle of
international relations, and dharma turns the lives of men [sic] away from
evil deeds, mutual intolerance, and armed conflict…. the whole political
organization was made subsidiary to moral law in a concrete translation
of the law into specific forms of human relations” (Nikam and McKeon
1959 at pp. 19–21).
Aśoka’s dharma was truly revolutionary. Bruce Rich asserts: “Aśoka’s
revolution is one of public as well as private morality. A daring attempt to
move Kautilyan society toward transcending its grounding in an ethic of
power, force, and wealth to one evolving toward nonviolence, tolerance,
and charity” (Rich 2010 at pp. 131–132). As Tharpar notes, “Religious
texts of the time stressed man’s responsibility to his religion and to his
ancestors. To these Aśoka added yet another responsibility, perhaps the
most important, that of responsibility to one’s fellow human beings …”
(Tharpar 1997 at p. 271). Empires of the ancient world were founded and
governed by ruthless monarchs, and their external relations were char-
acterized by constant conflict, not peace. Viewed against this norm, we
can begin to appreciate the uniqueness of Aśoka’s doctrine of nonvio-
lence, ethical development, and mutual care. As distinguished Indologist
Richard Salomon maintains, “even a cursory study of the history of
ancient India suffices to show that war was the rule and peace very much
the exception,” that exception was the kingdom of Aśoka (Salomon 2007
at p. 60).
Aśoka possessed a paternalistic conception of his monarchy, combining
affection with authority, delight with duty. He explicitly states in Kalinga
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Rock Edict I that his citizens should come to realize “that the king is
like a father, and that he feels for them as for himself, for they are like
his own children to him.” This attitude extended beyond his kingdom
too, embracing all of mankind: “all men are my children; and, just as
I desire for my children that they may attain every kind of welfare and
happiness both in this world and the next, so do I desire for all men.”
In Pillar Edict IV, he further instructs his appointees to adopt the same
protective attitude; as if they had been entrusted with the care of Aśoka’s
children. This benevolent authoritarianism of Aśoka differs somewhat
from the Buddhist ideal of kingship, however. Buddha, in his teachings,
idealized the monarch as a “great elect,” one chosen by the people and
ultimately responsible to them.9 By Aśokan times, however, republican
states and more democratic monarchies had been subsumed by ever-
larger, more centralized and more controlling monarchies, and Aśoka’s
empire reflected this authoritarian trend.10 Aśoka’s notion of kingship
was benevolent but also more absolute than the Buddhist ideal.
Aśokan Policies
Beyond these general governing principles, the Edicts also describe the
chief characteristics of Aśokan policy and administration. As noted, the
first principle was nonviolence, which for its time, and perhaps for any
time, made Aśokan governance exceptional. Policies of nonviolence are
most evident in Aśoka’s renunciation of the use of offensive war in state-
craft. He recommended the same for his successors, although he allowed
in Rock Edict XIII that, if his heirs must resort to warfare, it should be
accompanied by “mercy and light punishments.” Aśoka was not a pacifist,
however. He did not disband his army, and the use of force defensively
remained an available option if necessary for the security of his kingdom.
Aśoka also limited state violence as a tool in the administration of justice
for criminal offenses, although he did not eliminate capital punishment.
Consistent with his Buddhist beliefs, nonviolence or reducing violence
was a policy that Aśoka applied to all living beings, not just humans. In
this respect, Aśoka was not an absolutist, but he refrained from eating
living beings, outlawed ceremonial animal sacrifice, and reduced the use
of meat in the royal kitchen (limited to two hens and one deer per day).
He restricted hunting and fishing practices by protecting certain species
and banning killing on certain dates and he gave up the traditional prac-
tice of royal hunts as a diversion, instead using his travel as an opportunity
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to explore sights of religious significance and to share the dharma with
his subjects.
Second, Aśokan policy was characterized by strong social welfare initia-
tives and the provision of expanded public works. Several scholars have
noted that Aśoka’s policies contained the seeds of the modern welfare
state (Sarkisyanz 1965; Tharpar 1997; Singh 2012; Rich 2010). Aśoka
himself proclaims in the Sixth Pillar Edict “Thus do I provide for the
welfare and happiness of the world—in the same way as I bring happiness
to my relatives, both close and distant and work for it, so do I provide for
all classes.” Perhaps most significant in this regard was Aśoka’s policies of
providing medical care for his citizens and foreign travelers through the
construction of public hospitals and clinics. He further provided for the
care of animals via the creation of veterinary centers. Aśoka constructed
roads, dams, and irrigation facilities. He planted medicinal trees and herbs
inside and outside his kingdom for their beneficial public health effects.
In Pillar Edict VII, he describes how he provided rest houses, wells, and
shade trees along trade routes for the benefit of citizens and foreign trav-
elers. According to Rock Edict II, Aśoka extended these charitable works
beyond his own kingdom to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the Near East (Syria),
and Greek territories near his borders—an early form of foreign assistance.
Aśoka’s policies also reflected an environmental awareness that is
consistent with Buddha’s guidance to live in harmony with the natural
world given the interdependence of all living things. As noted, he
attempted to ban or limit the unnecessary killing of animals, specifying
in detail in Pillar Edict V protected classes of animals. He prohibited the
burning of animal habitat as a technique for clearing agricultural lands
or driving animals for a hunt, he outlawed the feeding of animals to
other animals, and he sought to improve cultivation of agricultural and
medicinal crops.
The Aśokan principles of tolerance, pluralism, and dialogue are best
seen in his policies promoting the practice of all religions and encour-
aging mutual understanding among people of all faiths. Aśoka’s Edicts
promoted not only Buddhism but also traditional Brahmanical sects and
those of the “śraman. as” (those practicing outside the mainstream).11 In
Rock Edict VII, Aśoka acknowledges that all sects encourage self-restraint
and personal purification and, therefore, he desires that they should all
dwell anywhere in his empire. He further recommends in Rock Edict
XII that all people should appreciate and listen to the teachings of reli-
gions other than their own to recognize their underlying ethical unity.
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Aśoka’s policies went far beyond mere passive “tolerance” of other reli-
gions to include an active engagement, “inter-faith dialogue” in modern
terms, an effort to appreciate and learn from other traditions. In Rock
Edict XII he cautions: “whosoever honors his own sect and condemns
the sect of others wholly from devotion to his own sect…injures more
gravely his own. Therefore, concord is to be commended, so that men
may hear one another’s principles and obey them.” Aśoka recommended
generosity toward the Brahmins and śraman. as in the Ninth Major Rock
Edict and, leading by personal example, Aśoka dedicated large sums for
the housing of ascetics of the Ajivika and Jain sects, noted in the Barabar
Cave Inscriptions, not just for the Buddhist sangha.
Aśokan policies advocated for rule of law and the impartial adminis-
tration of justice consistent with Buddha’s principle of the equality and
dignity of all human beings. In Pillar Edict IV, he says “there should be
uniformity in judicial proceedings and punishments,” a remarkable phrase
that has been read in two ways. More narrowly, this directive has been
interpreted to mean that Aśoka was mandating uniformity in the applica-
tion of the law throughout all geographic areas of his empire. If so, this
was an important call for consistency and fairness in rule of law. Aśoka’s
call for uniformity in judicial proceedings and punishments has also been
interpreted more expansively to suggest that Aśoka was mandating that
law and the administration of justice should not discriminate by caste,
class, or occupation unlike the prevailing Brahmanic tradition that distin-
guished offenders and punishments by caste and position. If so, then
Aśoka’s words were mandating full equal justice before the law for all
citizens (Rich 2010). Although either reading would constitute an impor-
tant step in the advancement of social justice, in the broader meaning,
the Edict’s pronouncement would have been a breakthrough in terms of
human rights and equality consistent with Buddha’s rejection of social
caste and hierarchy.
Aśokan policies also tempered justice with mercy. He encouraged his
rural administrators to be both fair and moderate in their administration
of justice. Aśoka did not do away with the death penalty, but, he instructs
in the Fourth Pillar Edict that judges must provide a three-day respite
to any prisoner sentenced to death so that their family may appeal the
order and, even if unsuccessful, the prisoner may have time to undertake
final good works in preparation for his next life. In his Fifth Major Rock
Edict, Aśoka promotes the welfare of prisoners more generally: advocating
for the release of those who have children, are afflicted, or aged. In his
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Fifth Pillar Edict, he remarks that he has released one prisoner for each of
the 25 years of his reign. To ensure that officials were not abusing their
judicial authority, Aśoka instituted triennial and quinquennial surveillance
tours from the central government, what we might call policy audits, and
he personally participated in these efforts.
In addition to the fair and compassionate administration of justice,
Aśoka was also an early advocate of policies of “good governance,”
meaning transparency, accessibility, impartiality, and accountability. He
warned his administrators to avoid weaknesses such as anger, laziness,
impatience, and any kind of prejudice and, as noted, he followed up on his
admonitions by sending a royal or provincial inspector to insure his direc-
tives were followed. Through his Edicts, his travels, and the peripatetic
nature of his administrators, Aśoka underscored that regular communica-
tion with his subjects was a major policy priority. Aśoka was committed to
a policy of personal accessibility and sought to demonstrate his commit-
ment to good governance. For example, he commits to be available to his
citizens stating in Rock Edict VI: “In all places do I dispose of the affairs
of the people … [important information] should …be reported to me in
all places, at all hours.” He adds, “I never feel satisfaction in my exertions
and dispatch of business. For work I must for the welfare of all the folk
… the root is energy … for nothing is more essential than the welfare of
all the folk.” In the Edicts, he exhorts his administrators to efficacy and
hard work. “Transparency, efficiency, and exertion” was the motto of his
governance.
S.J. Tambiah summarizes Aśoka’s policies as “protection and liberal-
ity” (Tambiah 1976 at p. 39). Bruce Rich describes the underpinnings
of Asokan rule as “justice, prudence, and beneficence” (Rich 2010 at
p. 129). The resemblances between Aśoka’s ideals and policies with the
principles of the European Enlightenment in terms of equality, rationality,
tolerance of dissent, freedom of belief, and justice under the law, and
the parallels between Aśoka’s social policies and those of the modern
welfare state, are obvious, but recall that Aśoka was writing in Asia in
the third century BCE. For historical comparison, this was the Warring
States period in China.
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Aśoka’s Foreign Policy
Aśoka’s message of acceptance of diversity, good works, tolerance, and
nonviolence also extended to his foreign policy and his treatment of
foreigners within the empire. The promotion of the dharma was also
the hallmark of Aśokan foreign policy. For example, in Rock Edict I he
states: “The Beloved of the Gods [Aśoka] considers victory by dharma to
be the foremost victory … [and] has gained this victory on all frontiers
to a distance of 600 yojonas (about 4000 miles)” (Tharpar 1997).
Recall, following his remorse over the bloodshed and suffering of the
Kalinga war, Aśoka foreswore future military aggression as an instrument
of policy (a promise he kept) and vowed to engage only in peaceful “con-
quest by dharma.”12 This reference to conquest does not mean seeking
political dominion over others or a religious crusade, but rather refers to
the Buddhist notion of conquering of the self and coming to understand
one’s responsibilities for others as discussed in Chapter 2. For Aśoka, the
essence of law, politics, and administration was insight into oneself and
respect for others. Consistent with his word, he made propagation of
dharma his main objective, and he pursued a statecraft of conciliation,
stability, and security designed to reduce international tensions (Rock
Edicts I, XVI).
Aśoka lived in a time of expanded communication and travel between
the Eastern Mediterranean and South Asia. As part of his diplomacy,
Aśoka dispatched emissaries (dharma ambassadors) to Ceylon, Egypt,
Syria, Greece, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and the Himalayas and
to the Cholas and the Pandyas, his immediate neighbors to the South
(Zhang 2012). The stated goal of these foreign missions was not religious
promulgation or conquest (although conquest was within Aśoka’s powers
in some cases) but promotion of mutual understanding, acquaintance
with Aśoka’s dharma, and economic betterment through commercial
exchange. Aśoka established particularly friendly relations with Ceylon,
his neighbor to the South and encouraged the spread of dharma there.
Aśoka’s foreign policies, like his domestic policies, were designed to be
both morally correct and expedient and likely to prove beneficial to
Aśoka’s empire (Jayatilleke 1967). History does not reveal what reception
his ambassadors received but Aśoka undoubtedly increased the stature and
spread of his ideas throughout Asia (Bandarkar 1925; Gelblum 1957).
Aśoka was an early practitioner of foreign aid and cultural diplomacy as
instruments of statecraft. He practiced the exercise of “soft power” by
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establishing medical facilities in foreign lands, sharing beneficial plants,
and installing infrastructure beyond his immediate borders as acts of
goodwill toward neighboring countries.
Aśoka did not live in peaceful times and he had to govern a geographi-
cally vast and ethnically variegated empire,13 so his transition from violent
conquest to forgoing aggression must have been challenging. Aśoka had
to deal with tensions among social classes and religious sects, lawless
people on his frontiers, and other nations and empires with vastly different
political systems. Aśoka chose to address these challenges affirmatively.
First, he developed and promulgated a unifying ethic, a civil dharma of
social responsibility designed to raise people’s moral outlook both within
and beyond his borders. Second, in his actions, Aśoka pursued policies
that advanced social welfare and happiness through good deeds, public
works, and the provision of good governance or foreign assistance. In
Rock Edict VI, he states “I consider the promotion of the people’s welfare
my highest duty…. I owe to all living creatures to make them happy in
this world and help them attain heaven in the next” (Nikam and McKeon
1959 at p. 38). In this respect too, Aśoka was following Buddha’s political
teachings on what constitutes a just and legitimate monarch contained in
the sūtras of the Pali canon.14
Aśoka’s Forcefulness
Lest one conclude that Aśoka was naïve in his approach to domestic
politics or foreign relations in his appeal to people’s better nature, it
should also be noted that Aśoka’s Edicts reveal a practical shrewdness, an
understanding of power, and great skill in administrative control. Some
interpreters of Aśoka’s policies characterize Asoka’s forcefulness as what
one author calls “Buddhist realism,” that is, Aśoka kept the requisites of
putative power: a full treasury; a large, strong, and well-equipped army;
and an extensive administrative structure (Tambiah 1976; Gokhale 1966).
A more recent work describes Aśoka’s empire “as a fusion of real politik
and moral politik” (Shahi 2019 at p. 57; see earlier Albinski 1958). Recall
Aśoka had inherited a philosophy of real politik from his grandfather and
his grandfather’s advisor, Kautilya, and a substantial bureaucracy from his
ancestors.
While this is one possible interpretation of Aśoka’s actions, viewed
through a Buddhist lens, Aśoka’s understanding and use of power could
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be interpreted as a form of “wrathful compassion”—strong actions moti-
vated by love and compassion for those acted upon, although they
appear to an outside observer as motivated by anger or desire for power.
The best example of wrathful compassion in the West is the parable of
Christ throwing the moneychangers out of the temple. Buddhism, espe-
cially in its later Mahayana and Vajrayana forms accentuates the wrathful
compassion of Buddha’s representations.
Aśoka’s subtle exercise of tolerance with strength and compassion can
be seen in his message to the lawless people on his frontiers:
Unconquered peoples along the border of my dominions may wonder what
my disposition is toward them. My only wish with respect to them is
they
should not fear me, but trust me; that they should expect only happiness
from me, not misery; that they should understand further that I will
forgive
them for offenses that can be forgiven; that they should be induced by
my
example to practice dharma; and that they should attain happiness in
this
world and the next (Nikam and McKeon 1959 at p. 53).
Implied in Aśoka’s message, of course, is that he has the power to forgive,
or not. In addressing the unruly forest dwellers of his empire, he was even
more direct, warning them in Rock Edict XIII that they should follow his
instructions so that, despite his avowed restraint, they may not be shamed
or killed. Perhaps for these reasons, in her classic study, Tharpar concludes
that Aśoka was a “stern monarch” (Tharpar 1997).
Conclusion
History does not provide a detailed record of Aśoka’s empire. In the
Indian library, philosophy and myth predominate and history is described
as “the empty shelf” (Salomon 2007).15 We do know that he ruled a
great and vast state of growing wealth and expanded commerce (based
on archeological records) for nearly 40 years and the final 32 years were a
unique time of both prosperity and peace on the subcontinent. Roughly
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50 years after Aśoka’s death, the Mauryan empire fragmented for reasons
that history can only speculate upon.16
Notes
1. Aśoka, in his writings, never refers to himself as a cakkavatti, instead
describing himself as the “Beloved of the Gods,” or by the name,
“Piyadasi,” meaning “one who sees affectionately” or “one who is of
gracious mien” (Bandarkar 1925). Interestingly, the name Aśoka translates
as “one without sorrow” or “one beyond sorrow,” which is an appellation
often applied to Buddha, himself, as he had transcended the sufferings of
samsara.
2. A.L Basham explains that the legends of Aśoka described in Sri Lankan,
Indian, and Chinese sources have little in common except that they
describe a “mighty Indian ruler, whose capital was Pataliputra, and
who adopted a new enlightened policy as a result of his conversion to
Buddhism. Almost everything else is missing in one source or another”
(Basham 1982 at p. 132).
3. The Edicts consist of fourteen Rock Edicts, seven Pillar Edicts, and
miscellaneous site-specific Edicts, often found in caves.
4. Interestingly, for reasons of shame, sensitivity, or pragmatism, Aśoka did
not post this message in Kalinga itself (Singh 2012).
5. Prior to his conversion, scholars believe that Aśoka practiced the prevailing
Brahmanical religion and was said to be a devotee of Shiva (Gelblum
1957). It should be remembered that at that time Buddhism was an
influential sect but not a major religion.
6. In the Rummindei Pillar inscription he declares: “No one is to cause
dissension in the Order. The Order of monks and nuns has been united,
and this unity should last for as long as my sons and great grandsons, and
the moon and the sun. Whoever creates a schism in the Order, whether
monk or nun, is to be dressed in white garments, and to be put in a place
not inhabited by monks or nuns.”
7. Some authors, such as Tharpar, assume a skeptical attitude toward the
notion of Aśoka’s rule as Buddhist (Tharpar 1997). Others, such as
Bandarkar, Gokhale, and Kumar are inclined to see Aśoka’s reign as a
more direct extension of his Buddhist beliefs in the worldly sphere of
politics (Bandarkar 1925; Gokhale 1948; Kumar 2017).
8. Following his enlightenment, Buddha’s first teaching was on the Four
Noble Truths: one must know life’s sufferings; the causes of these
sufferings; what is the end of suffering; and the path to liberation from
suffering.
9. See, in particular, the Aggañña sūtra.
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10. While under siege from powerful monarchies and in retreat at the time
of Buddha, republican forms of government in India likely began in the
late Vedic period (the early first millennium BCE) and persisted in some
form until the third or fourth century AD (Muhlberger 1998; Sarkisyanz
1965). “Republican” in the context of ancient India means that a larger
group of individuals were involved in decision making and governance
processes relative to monarchic states and that political practice reflected
a preference for decision making by deliberation rather than command.
The republics were not fully democratic, but they did involve collective
decision making by select groups, families, castes, or occupations. This
governance by discussion and limited enfranchisement can be viewed as
a form of republicanism. Furthermore, K.P. Jayaswal notes that Buddha’s
sūtras refer to ballot voting, majoritarian decision making, and referen-
dums without definition, leading him to conclude that these political
procedures must have been taken for granted by the time of Buddha’s
teachings (Jayaswal 2005).
11. In contrast to the dominant Brahmanical sects, the śraman. as is a term
that referred to those groups, including Buddhists but also the Ajivaka,
Lokayata, Jaina, and the agnostic (Ajñana) sects, that went forth out
of mainstream society and governmental control to wander and think
freely without societal constraints, supported by alms and donations from
followers and those attending their public lectures. Later, some of these
groups, most particularly Buddhists, settled in enclaves near cities and
along trade routes and developed codified principles in the governing
laws for their communities. The śraman. as generally believed that experi-
ence alone was the highest authority and that the universe is subject to
natural, discoverable laws and that by understanding and living in accor-
dance with these laws, human beings could find meaning. They rejected
the prevailing religious justification for social hierarchy, advocated for the
equality of all individuals in their potential for spiritual advancement, and
promoted tolerance of personal difference. Buddha specifically rejected
the Brahmanical myths of divine creation of the world and separation of
humans by race and class.
12. Elsewhere, Aśoka specifically instructs his successors, sons, and grandsons
to aim for victory by dharma, not military means.
13. Rock Edict II mentions ethnic groups such as the Yonas (those of
Greek or Western ethnicity), Gandharas, Yavanas, Kambojas, Ristikas, and
Pitinikas, within or at the outskirts of his empire.
14. See the Aggañña, Mahāsudassana, Cakkavatti-S̄ıhanāda, and Kūt.adanta
sūtras.
15. Salomon notes: “In broad terms, Indian civilization is more concerned
with the presentation and consideration of normative theories than in the
recording of pragmatic realities” (Salomon 2007 at p. 53).
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16. See Romila Tharpar, Aśoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, 3rd ed.,
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997. In Chapter 7 of this work,
Tharpar dismisses several theories that attempt to explain the decline of
the Mauryan empire by reference to military inactivity during Aśoka’s
reign, Brahmin resentment of his dharma, popular uprisings by restive
groups, or economic pressures. Instead, Tharpar cites the general lack of
a national consciousness on the subcontinent and the absence of strong
leadership after Aśoka as reasons for the empire’s decline.
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CHAPTER 5
Modern Bhutan’s Buddhist Statecraft
Abstract This chapter introduces the country of Bhutan and its unique
pursuit of a Buddhist-inspired foreign policy during the modern era
(1949–present). This chapter illustrates how a modern state implements
a national security and economic development policy consistent with
Buddhist philosophical principles and Buddha’s political and economic
teachings and, like the prior chapter, it serves as proof of concept for
the possibility of putting Buddhist ideas into practice. The cornerstone of
Bhutan’s foreign and domestic policies is its pursuit of Gross National
Happiness, a concept that endorses holistic progress in the material,
spiritual, emotional, cultural, and environmental welfare of its society.
Keywords Bhutan · Gross national happiness · Bhutanese foreign policy
Introduction
Foreign policy is a tool in the hands of a nation-state that allows it to
advantageously shape the behavior of other states and the international
system. For a very small state like Bhutan, however, foreign policy is less
grandiose and more defensive in nature, allowing it to ward off pressures
and other adverse aspects of the international system and pursue its essen-
tial goals of physical security, economic development, and preservation of
its identity and culture.1
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Bhutan is a small and vulnerable country because of its physical
features, including: geographic size (about that of Switzerland); inacces-
sibility (it is landlocked with the closest international port 450 miles away
through India), population (about 800,000), economy (per capita GNP
about 3000 USD), and military strength (an 8000-person army with no
navy or air force). Its vulnerability stems not only from its size but from
its location. Bhutan is “sandwiched” between two nuclear-armed, antag-
onistic Asian giants, India and China, or as the locals say using their own
gastronomic metaphor, Bhutan is “caught like a yam between two boul-
ders.”2 Nevertheless, this improbable country, by virtue of its Himalayan
boundary to the north, the forests and diseases of its southlands, and its
centuries of closure to the outside world has avoided conquest or colo-
nization by invading Tibetans, Mongols, and Brits3 and has remained an
independent Buddhist nation since the early seventeenth century, with a
distinct archeological identity stretching back 4000 years.
A History of Modern Bhutanese Statecraft
For our purposes, I will consider only modern Bhutan, meaning the
period from 1949 to the present.4 Since 1949, Bhutan has followed a
foreign policy based on close relations with India, pursuing an alliance
strategy not uncommon for small powers. The reasons for the associ-
ation with India are primarily threefold.5 The first reason is historical.
India, when it became independent in 1947, stepped into the shoes
of Britain vis-à-vis Bhutan. In 1910, to retain its sovereignty against
British encroachment, Bhutan’s First King, Ugyen Wangchuck,6 signed
the Treaty of Punakha with the British that left Bhutan’s autonomy suffi-
ciently ambiguous to both parties: Great Britain agreed “to exercise no
interference in the internal administration of Bhutan,” but Bhutan agreed
“to be guided by the advice of the British government in regard to its
external relations.”7 A 1949 successor treaty of friendship and coopera-
tion between India and Bhutan similarly provided that Bhutan would seek
Indian guidance in its foreign affairs. This provision with India lost much
of its authority de facto over time but remained in effect de jure until
2007.8
The second motive for close ties with India was pragmatic and material.
In the early years of Bhutan’s emergence from isolation (1949–1971) the
country lacked the human, financial, and institutional resources to func-
tion as a fully independent international actor without India’s support.
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Further, Bhutan’s travel and supply lines ran south through India as the
easier and more direct route for commerce relative to the mountainous
northern route to Tibet. India quickly became Bhutan’s major source of
trade, foreign aid, and investment.
The third reason for the alliance with India was security. Although
Bhutan had historically pursued a policy of isolation, events immediately
after World War II made isolation and neutrality untenable policies. In
1950, the new Chinese government, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), invaded Tibet, and Bhutan found itself with Chinese troops
on its border.9 Subsequent crackdowns by the Chinese government on
the Tibetan people (Bhutan’s cultural and spiritual cousins), an influx
of Tibetan refugees into Bhutan following the PRC’s consolidation of
control in 1959, and a dispute over border territories between Bhutan
and the PRC combined to constitute a direct security threat to Bhutan.
This threat led Bhutan to close its northern border, thus ending commer-
cial exchange with China and severing a 1000-year-old relationship with
Tibet. These events also cemented Bhutan’s security and economic ties
with India and led Bhutan out of its isolation policy and toward a gradual
engagement in international relations to better define and defend its
statehood (Fig 5.1).10
The alliance between Bhutan and India made geostrategic sense for
India too, especially after its 1962 border war with China. Bhutan serves
as a buffer state between India and China. Moreover, Bhutan, along with
Bangladesh, border and protect a narrow strip of land known as the
Siliguri Corridor, which connects the main body of India to its north-
eastern states.11 These northeastern Indian states have often been the
locus of insurgency against the Indian central government and could be
cut off from the main body of India by a Chinese incursion into the
Corridor.
Bhutan’s Third King, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, who came to power in
1952, expanded Bhutan’s international relations by applying for United
Nation’s observer status in the late 1960s, and the country was granted
full U.N. membership at the end of his rule in 1971.12 Bhutan also
joined regional international organizations and expanded bilateral ties
with several countries to diversify its relations with the international
community. But, Bhutan had no interest in Cold War great power poli-
tics, and to this day, has not established direct diplomatic relations with
any of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Simi-
larly, in seeking foreign assistance for its development, Bhutan’s former
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Fig. 5.1 Main features of South Asia (Source Updated from map cour-
tesy of University of Texas Libraries, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_
east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg)
Prime Minister explained “We are looking for economic assistance from
countries other than traditional donor nations, but we are determined to
ensure that such aid has no political strings attached. We shall not seek
aid from either the U.S. or the USSR as we do not wish to get involved
in the super power racket” (Bhardwaj 2016 at p. 60).13 Instead, Bhutan
has cautiously engaged with a variety of other multilateral and regional
initiatives to further its independence and interests. The Third King also
began a concerted focus on Bhutan’s economic modernization through
the institution of five-year economic plans beginning in 1961.
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The Fourth King of Bhutan, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, came to power
in 1972 and set the country on a generation-long path to full democ-
ratization and decentralization, believing that good government in the
modern era could not be assured by an absolutist regime but required
full participation by its citizens.14 He accelerated the process of modern-
ization through encouraging a greater role for the private sector in the
economy. He established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to capitalize on
Bhutan’s new U.N. membership as its second major channel with the
outside world. Importantly, to help the country secure a national identity
that would meld Bhutan’s culture and Buddhist values with the modern-
ization process, he introduced the strategy of pursuing Gross National
Happiness as the touchstone of all governmental efforts, both domestic
and foreign.
GNH is Bhutan’s unique multidimensional approach to development
that seeks to maintain a harmonious balance among material well-being
and the spiritual, emotional, and cultural needs of society (Ura et al.
2015). It is authentically distinct from the Western notion of develop-
ment where the sole measure of success is material, the expansion of
Gross National Product (GNP).15 GNH seeks to promote sustainable
development without sacrificing Bhutan’s Buddhist values and culture.
Bhutan’s most important economic policy body, the National Planning
Commission, explained Bhutan’s independent path: “Simply imposing
development models from outside which do not take religion and tradi-
tion into account will only serve to diminish existing culture [and] meet
with limited success” (Wangmo and Valk 2012 at p. 56). Bhutan was
clear that its Buddhist development model differs profoundly from the
Western GNP growth model: “Our approach to development has been
shaped by beliefs and values of the faith we have held for more than
1000 years firmly rooted in our rich tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism.16
The approach stresses not material rewards, but individual develop-
ment, sanctity of life, compassion for others, respect for nature, and
the importance of compromise” (Royal Government of Bhutan Planning
Commission 1999 at p. 19).
Bhutan’s GNH approach to national development challenged many
tenets of economic orthodoxy, most importantly the fundamental
assumption that increasing material output and consumption automati-
cally equates with increasing levels of human happiness (Upreti 2016).
Buddha directly rejected this idea (as does recent social and behavioral
sciences)17 and taught that a singular focus on material acquisition and
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consumption leads to dissatisfaction and unhappiness, not enduring and
meaningful happiness.
“Happiness,” in the Bhutanese Buddhist sense of the term, has a
meaning distinct from Western conceptions of happiness. In Buddhism,
happiness does not equate with Western notions of hedonic (“feel good”)
pleasure or the concept of overall life satisfaction used by Western social
scientists. Nor is the Buddhist notion of happiness fully analogous to
Aristotle’s notion of happiness as eudemonia, the sense of deep content-
ment arising from living a virtuous life (although moral discipline and
virtue are the foundations for higher forms of happiness in Buddhism).
In Buddhism, true, lasting happiness is a state of mind and therefore
can only be obtained by understanding, purifying, and controlling the
mind, not merely improving one’s external circumstances.18 Enduring
happiness is not principally about securing ever-better external condi-
tions because happiness is the product of an internal state of mind. The
former prime minister of Bhutan, Jigme Thinley, summarized the notion
of genuine happiness from a Buddhist perspective: “We know that true
abiding happiness cannot exist while others suffer, and comes only from
serving others, living in harmony with nature, and realizing our innate
wisdom and the true and brilliant nature of our own minds” (Gross
National Happiness Center 2014).19
As noted, Buddhism does not ignore the need for material comforts or
good external conditions as these assist one’s development and provide a
lesser form of happiness in themselves. Buddha instructed that society
should be organized to provide good conditions for all. Government
policies, no matter how charitable or enlightened, however, cannot
directly make its citizens happier in the Buddhist sense. The state’s
responsibility is to provide the best possible conditions to contribute
to material and mental development for the greatest number of people
given available resources. It is the job of government to remove obstacles
that inhibit an individual’s personal progress and to reduce unneces-
sary suffering. This responsibility is what makes happiness a political and
socioeconomic project, as well as an individual goal, and justifies the
state’s pursuit of GNH. Bhutan’s development strategy has succeeded in
improving material and social conditions consistent with this broader defi-
nition of progress. Further, Bhutan’s development strategy reflects many
Buddhist economic principles and priorities including poverty eradica-
tion; providing for full employment; guaranteeing life’s essentials such as
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health care, housing, and education; and safeguarding a healthy environ-
ment. Bhutan accomplishes these aims through a mixed market economy
with substantial state involvement. Looking at the most widely recog-
nized measures of social and economic development in the areas to which
Bhutan and many other countries aspire reveals impressive improvement
in many important dimensions of development. The World Bank Survey
of Bhutan concludes, “The Kingdom of Bhutan is considered a develop-
ment success story with decreasing poverty and improvements in human
development indicators” (World Bank Group 2016).
Pursuing its distinctive course of development was not just a policy
preference; it was believed to be essential to the country’s very existence,
that is, a key component of national security policy. Journalist and govern-
ment official, Dasho Kinley Dorji, underscored the importance of GNH
to Bhutan’s survival: “We will never be a major economic or military force
so we decided our strength must lie in our identity, our cultural identity.
We must be different from other billions of people in the region or we will
be swallowed up” (Dorji 2010 at pp. 103–104). Bhutan’s constitution
provides, and its political elite repeatedly states, that Bhutan’s sovereignty
and its national survival depend on the preservation of its unique iden-
tity. The Fourth King reminded his citizens “Nor must we ever lose sight
of the fact that our nation is the last standing independent Mahāyāna
Buddhist kingdom in the world. We are the sole surviving custodians of a
social and cultural system that extended beyond the Eastern Himalayas to
embrace a large part of Eastern and South East Asia. The world has been
impoverished by the loss of the social and cultural system which is today
unique to Bhutan and where it both survives and flourishes” (Upreti 2016
at p. 6).20
It is important not to view Bhutan’s emphasis on culture through
Western eyes. Culture is not a secondary foreign policy issue for Bhutan,
it is its raison d’etre, essential to its very existence and one of the foremost
articles in the constitution. The Fourth King was clear on the existential
importance of culture for the country: “The only factor we can fall back
on, the only factor which can strengthen Bhutan’s sovereignty and our
different identity is the unique culture we have. I have always stressed the
great importance of developing our tradition because it has everything
to do with strengthening our security and sovereignty in determining
the future survival of Bhutanese people and our religion” (Brunet et al.
2009 at p. 244). The king’s reference to “our religion” is telling because
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although Bhutan has a rich culture in the form of extended family
relations, volunteerism, indigenous arts, and medicine, Buddhism and
culture are virtually isomorphic in Bhutan (Mancall 2004). Historian
Karma Phuntsho calls Buddhism in Bhutan a “civil religion” that informs
the country’s worldview, lifestyle, social behavior, economic practices,
and political thinking (Phuntsho 2013).
GNH also shaped other facets of Bhutan’s foreign policy. This influ-
ence is evidenced in Bhutan’s approach to accepting development assis-
tance only if it does not distort its values. Bhutan also chose to shelve its
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2009 after the protracted
debate when it concluded that membership would threaten Bhutan’s
GNH approach to development and drown the country’s identity in a
wave of globalization. A third example is Bhutan’s restrictive tourism
policy, styled as “High Value, Low Impact,” again to balance economic
growth with cultural and environmental protection (Brunet et al. 2009).
The Fourth King also sought to strengthen Bhutan’s independence
by continuing to diversify its sources of foreign support and devel-
oping indigenous economic capabilities, most particularly in hydropower.
Bhutan would come to play an active role in SAARC, the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, and in U.N. organizations such as
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). He also built on the
work of the Third King in gaining international recognition for Bhutan’s
sovereignty, most importantly with China who recognized Bhutan’s inde-
pendence for the first time in a 1998 agreement on maintaining peace in
the border areas between the two countries,21 and with India, who, as
noted, renegotiated its treaty of friendship with Bhutan in 2007 without
any suggestion of influence over Bhutan’s foreign policy as contained in
the 1949 predecessor. Today, Bhutan is a member of more than 150 inter-
national organizations and has established diplomatic relations with more
than 50 countries.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Fourth King began a controversial
initiative that emphasized the need for cultural continuity as a source
of Bhutan’s national security, noting that prosperity, modernization, and
development will not bring satisfaction, if it comes as the cost of a loss
of tradition, culture, or religion (Tobgye 2012). Bhutan, a latecomer
to development, had seen numerous other nations shed their traditional
culture and values, or in the case of the Buddhist kingdom of Sikkim,
lose its sovereign independence, on the road to modernization. The
government’s concern for cultural preservation led to the passage of
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revised, more restrictive citizenship laws and laws promoting the domi-
nant Drukpa language and culture,22 thus creating frictions with Bhutan’s
large ethnic minority Nepali population, many of whom are Hindu, speak
Nepali, and had immigrated to Bhutan for work during the 1950s and
1960s. The tension between the rights of economic migrants on the one
hand and the government’s effort to preserve Bhutan’s delicate ethno-
demographic balance through its citizenship laws and cultural promotion
policies on the other, erupted in violence beginning with an uprising
against the government by ethic Nepali Bhutanese in the south of the
country in 1990, governmental suppression of the uprising, and the even-
tual departure of roughly 100,000 ethnic Nepali from Bhutan to Nepal
and India and then on to host countries in the West when Bhutan and
Nepal failed to negotiate a settlement agreement. This ethnic strife and
the subsequent dispute over refugee settlement with Nepal were the most
significant exception to Bhutan’s otherwise tolerant domestic policies and
its friendly relations with neighboring states during the modern period
(Hutt 2003; Long 2019).
Conclusion
Bhutan’s foreign policy is, in many ways, a product of its small size and
precarious location within the international system. These are “givens” for
Bhutan. Nonetheless, Bhutanese foreign policy also reflects elements of a
distinctive “Buddhist statecraft.” The Buddhist dimensions of Bhutanese
statecraft are reflected in its efforts at internal consolidation, external secu-
rity, and modernization through its GNH-led development policies and
Bhutan’s problematic cultural unity initiatives. Bhutan’s GNH develop-
ment strategy is a direct reflection of its longstanding Buddhist beliefs.
Second, Bhutan’s efforts to gradually expand its international relations
in a peaceful, multilateral, and conflict-avoidant approach to diplomacy
is consistent with its Buddhist values of nonviolence. Bhutan’s decision
to eschew great power politics and ideological debates in establishing its
foreign aid partners and its foreign embassies are two key examples of
its cautious, conciliatory, and pragmatic approach to diplomacy. Likewise,
its good neighbor policies and its efforts to build regional links that are
mutually beneficial and respectful are consistent with idealized notions of
Buddhist statecraft.
Most would conclude that for a small country Bhutan has been
successful in its foreign policy during the modern era. It has navigated a
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course from isolation to engagement and defined an independent identity
among much larger states in its region. Can this small, exceptional state
continue to modernize without losing its unique culture and Buddhist
values in the face of the pressures of globalization? The answer remains
to be seen (Long 2017). But for now, Bhutan provides us with a modern
prototype of a Buddhist approach to international relations.
Notes
1. Article 4 of Bhutan’s constitution provides: “The State shall endeavor
to preserve, protect, and promote the cultural heritage of the country,
including . . . language, literature, visual arts, and religion to enrich society
. . .” This emphasis on culture traces its roots to the consolidation of the
Bhutanese state by Ngawang Namgyal in the seventeenth century. To
create a distinct Bhutanese identity, he established the driglam namzha
(national values and traditions) that provided guidelines for architecture,
festivals, and public dress and behavior.
2. The phrase was first used in the eighteenth century to refer to Nepal’s
plight, but has since been applied with equal accuracy to Bhutan.
3. Bhutan did suffer a defeat at the hands of the British in the Duar War
(1864–1865) and the loss of a piece of its southern territory in the Treaty
of Sinchula.
4. See Phuntsho (2013) for a comprehensive history of Bhutan.
5. Bhutan also shares with India a long history of anticolonial struggle
against Great Britain and ties of religion that date to 672 AD when the
Indian holy man Padmasambhava, also known as Guru Rinpoche, brought
the Buddhist religion to Bhutan for the first time.
6. The monarchy is relatively new to Bhutan. From the seventeenth to the
twentieth century, Bhutan existed as a collection of feudal principalities
governed by a bifurcated system of national government with both a spir-
itual and temporal leader. The instability of this system led the country
to elect the first monarch in 1907 via popular consensus, as Buddha had
recommended in his political writings.
7. Great Britain did not insist on the creation of a regency in Bhutan as it
had in Sikkim and Nepal.
8. In 1978, Bhutan formally expressed its concern over the interpretation of
Article 2 of the treaty, which provided Bhutan would seek India’s advice
in foreign affairs. In a circulated statement by the Bhutanese govern-
ment, Bhutan emphasized the nonbinding nature of Article 2: “in regard
to its external relations, it would be entirely up to the Royal Govern-
ment of Bhutan to decide whether to accept such advice or not. It is
not correct to say that Bhutan’s future still depends on Indian goodwill
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and friendship” (Kharat 2007 at p. 277). In 2007, the 1949 Bhutan–
India Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was formally renegotiated.
The language of Article II of the 1949 Treaty, which had provided that
Bhutan would be guided by India in its foreign affairs was changed to
read: “the government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the government
of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues
related to their national interest. Neither government shall allow use of
its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of
the other” (Chandra 2017). Bhutan also demonstrated its independence
in foreign affairs by launching boundary talks with China in 1984 on its
own accord.
9. Bhutan has a 470-kilometer border with China in its Tibetan region. For
more on the border dispute see Bhardwaj 2016.
10. Military cooperation in the form of training missions began in 1961 when
India introduced the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan to help
with border security vis-à-vis a Chinese threat (Kharat and Bhutia 2019).
11. At its narrowest point the Siliguri Corridor is 25 km in width and contains
all the major train and road lines between India’s northeast and the rest
of the country.
12. In 1971–1972, Bhutan also established diplomatic relations with its
neighbor, Bangladesh, without seeking approval from India.
13. Bhutan was also an early and active member of the Non-Aligned
Movement.
14. Bhutan adopted a democratic constitution in 2008. Since that time, the
legal and institutional basis for democracy has taken root in Bhutan. Most
state institutions associated with democratic governance are performing
well, especially the Parliament, judiciary, and independent constitutional
agencies. Non-state actors such as the press, civil society organizations,
and parties, which are also critical to democracy, are at an early stage of
development and may need to increase their capacities to play a signifi-
cant role in Bhutan in coming years. For a discussion of Bhutan’s unique
transition to democracy see Turner, Chuki and Tshering 2011; Long
2019.
15. Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness policy seeks progress in nine domains
of human life. These domains are: psychological well-being (including
spirituality), health, time use, education, cultural diversity and resilience,
community vitality, good governance, ecological diversity and resilience,
and living standards (Ura et al. 2015 at pp. 10–11).
16. For simplicity more than accuracy, Buddhist traditions often have been
fitted to a tripartite taxonomy of Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna
forms. In general, Theravāda Buddhism is found in much of Southeast
Asia and Sri Lanka; Mahāyāna Buddhism throughout East and Central
Asia (China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Bhutan, Tibet, and Taiwan); and
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Vajrayāna (sometimes called “Tantric”) Buddhism is practiced primarily in
North Asia in countries such as Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Mongolia,
although tantric practices can be found in most Mahāyāna schools of
Buddhism. Although all forms of Buddhism share a common set of core
teachings, in terms of philosophy and practice, the Theravāda (Sanskrit
for “teaching of the elders”) tradition closely follows the sūtra teachings
of the historical Buddha with the goal of achieving personal liberation
from suffering by abandoning all delusions. The Mahāyāna (Sanskrit for
the “Great Vehicle”) tradition is primarily focused on the spiritual path to
“great enlightenment.” That is, the Mahāyāna goal is to attain Buddha-
hood for the benefit of all living beings by completely abandoning all
delusions and their imprints and coming to understand the non-dual
nature of all reality. Mahāyānists strive to exceed the goal of personal
liberation by making a compassionate commitment to seek enlightenment
for the liberation of all sentient beings. The means for pursuing this end
is the path of the bodhisattvas, those with a compassionate heart. The
Vajrayāna (Sanskrit for powerful and indestructible—like a lightning bolt
or a diamond) tradition is sometimes classified as a part of Mahāyāna
Buddhism, but some scholars consider it a different branch altogether. In
general terms, the aspiration of Vajrayāna practice is to train the mind by
bringing the future result (Buddhahood) into the present path by tran-
scending ordinary appearances and conceptions that keep human beings in
suffering. Through visualizing their body, environment, enjoyments, and
deeds as those of a Buddha, Vajrayāna practitioners attempt to expedite
their progress toward actual Buddhahood.
17. Contemporary social science, particularly psychology and economics, have
turned their attention to empirically studying the pursuit of happiness by
individuals and nations and identifying the correlates of happiness. This
literature finds that, regarding individual happiness, the evidence does not
support the assumption that more material welfare (money) necessarily
brings ever greater happiness (Diener and Seligman 2004). Rather, surveys
of subjects reveal that, over time, increases in income beyond the level of
satisfaction of basic needs did not produce significant differences in felt
well-being. Extra income matters most when we do not have a lot of it,
but the positive impact wears off once one reaches a basic level of material
comfort. There are many explanations as to why this is so. Instead the
correlates of personal happiness most often include: material sufficiency;
friends; marriage and family togetherness; good health; age (which has
a U-shaped relationship with happiness, with the low point in the late
forties); spirituality and religion; a sense of agency; altruistic activities;
social harmony; and a government perceived as stable, fair, and efficacious
(Layard 2005). As for societies, the data reveals, paradoxically, that within
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a given country huge increases in overall material welfare over time have
not led to corresponding increases in happiness (Easterlin 1974, 1995;
Diener et al. 1995; Inglehart 1990).
18. Understanding, purifying, and controlling the mind requires three related
practices: (1) developing moral maturity through mindfulness of one’s
ethical responsibilities; (2) reducing and eventually eliminating negative
emotions of hatred, greed, and ignorance, and replacing them with posi-
tive emotions of equanimity, compassion, and generosity that allow for
contentment and peace of mind; and (3) developing “wisdom,” which,
as discussed in Chapter Two, is an understanding of how ourselves and
all things truly exist, that is, realizing the radical interdependence of our
reality. By developing compassion and wisdom, one can abandon self-
grasping and self-cherishing (the pervasive delusions that are the root
cause of all unhappiness), liberate oneself from suffering and enjoy an
inexhaustible source of happiness that comes, naturally, from within,
according to Buddhism.
19. Most observers neglect the deeper meaning of Bhutan’s national goal
because they apply Western understandings of happiness to their analysis
of GNH. As Ross McDonald noted, it is “very easy to miss the deeper
[meaning] implied by GNH thinking and to completely miss the fact that
we missed this” (McDonald 2010 at p. 616).
20. Bhutan’s GNH alternative development model is a holistic approach to
well-being rooted in Buddhist values. The assertion of GNH became
Bhutan’s national desideratum and, in practice, Bhutan is the only country
in the world to completely adopt an alternative form of measuring
economic performance from that of expanding GNP. Michael Rowbotham
asserts that substituting a single word “happiness” for the word “product”
“injects humanity, in all its rich complexity, into economics” (Rowbotham
2013 at p. 175). The change in phraseology is said to have put people, not
output, at the center of development (Bracho 2013), and it made interi-
ority (happiness), not external conditions, the starting point for assessing
development (Hargens 2002).
21. As part of its growing independence in foreign affairs, Bhutan began direct
talks with the PRC over their border disputes in 1984. Previously, India
had led talks on Bhutan’s behalf. Bhutan–PRC talks have continued annu-
ally over three different disputed areas, with yet, no final solution, but a
commitment signed in 1998 to settle the dispute peacefully in accordance
with the sovereignty of both nations.
22. Bhutan has four major ethnic groupings: (1) in the west of the country
are the Ngalong or Ngalop; (2) in the center of the country are various
indigenous tribes; (3) in the east are the Sharchops; and (4) in the south
of the country are ethnic Nepalis known as the Lhotsampa (people of the
south). These first three groups are collectively known as the Drukpas.
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Abstract This chapter concludes with a summary of essential features of
a Buddhist approach to thinking about the world, our role in it, and
the type of political environments conducive to our higher nature. It
notes that Buddhism has historically shaped a wide variety of societies in
Asia and is adaptable to the Western world and to contemporary interna-
tional challenges. Further, rather than being unscientific or otherworldly,
Buddhist concepts are remarkably consistent with emerging findings in
the natural and biological sciences.
Keywords Buddhist policy · Neuroplasticity · Quantum · Buddhism and
science
Introduction
A Buddhist approach to IR provides an authentic and useful basis for
comparison with Western models because of its distinct philosophical
foundations: its ontology of radical interdependence, its ethics of respon-
sibility for “others,” and its assertion of the fundamental altruistic quality
of a fully realized human nature. This approach, to use an overused term,
is “revolutionary” in the sense that it challenges the deepest assumptions
of mainstream Western social theory. Unlike most revolutions, this one is
realized not on the streets so much as within our own minds; necessitating
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a fundamental reorientation in our perceptions, thoughts, emotions,
and actions, including ultimately, political actions at the national and
international level.
This short work outlines the political, economic, and international
prescriptions that flow from this different mindset and that, in turn,
support the mental and material development of individuals in reaching
their fuller potential. Further, it provides two examples of attempts to put
these ideas into practice: one historical and one contemporary.
Implications for Today’s Challenges
A Buddhist social theory necessarily begins with the doctrine of radical
interdependence, which underscores an individual’s responsibilities for
others, not just the promotion of individual choice and self-interest.
Buddha’s social formula gives greater emphasis to the duty of care we
owe each other and our natural and social environments. This concern
is reflected at a minimum in the principles of non-harm, nonaggres-
sion, and equality and ideally grows into an ethic of universal compas-
sion. At a national policy level, this political orientation might translate
into the promotion of democracy with an equal emphasis on indi-
vidual freedoms and social and environmental responsibility, for example.
Buddhist politics counsels that political systems must consciously weigh
the balance between the independence and interdependence of individuals
in society, and Buddhism’s assertion of radical interdependence tells us
our current fetish of radical individualism does not reflect reality. Politics,
in Buddhism, is not divorced from ethics and it recommends an emphasis
on civic virtues. Politics should reflect society’s aspirational values, espe-
cially the value of equality in terms of political access and avenues for
participation and equality of justice under law. Beyond impartiality, poli-
tics and policy must also reflect ethical principles such as honesty and
transparency, generosity, non-harm, forbearance, empathy, and a willing-
ness to compromise. National economic policies in turn should focus on
reducing the suffering of poverty by providing a strong social safety net
and encouraging full employment. Economic policy must also protect
workers and the environment from exploitation.
At the international level, a Buddhist approach might include initia-
tives that encourage a deeper recognition of our common humanity
and equality over particularism and nationalism. To illustrate a Buddhist
approach to one contemporary global challenge, the world might learn
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from humble Bhutan’s example in addressing the issue of environmen-
tally sustainable economic growth. Because of its Buddhist conviction that
all reality is interdependent and that our ethical responsibilities apply not
just to other individuals but to “all sentient beings” in this and future
lives, Bhutan has adopted strict environmental policies that govern its
economic development despite its status as low-income country. This
commitment is embodied in Bhutan’s Constitution, the first in the world
to require environmental sustainability and one that mandates that 60
percent or more of all land remain forested in perpetuity (Constitu-
tion of the Kingdom of Bhutan, Art. 5.3). In practice, Bhutan keeps 70
percent of its land in its pristine state and is a carbon negative country
while maintaining an enviable growth rate. Notably, as discussed in
Chapter 3, sustainability is an integral and natural dimension of Buddhist
economics through its emphasis on contentment, moderation, concern
for others (even future generations), and the importance of living in
harmony with nature. This approach differs from the prevailing liberal
economic approach where notions of sustainability are awkwardly bolted
onto, and in tension with, a maximization model. In her recent work
on Buddhist economics, Clair Brown explains that Buddhist economics
requires “strong sustainability” whereas free market economics pursues
“weak sustainability” (Brown 2017). The former connotes that physical
limits on natural capital exist and critical ecosystems must be preserved;
and the later means that humans can freely trade off different inputs into
the production process (Brown 2017 at pp. 64–65).
Buddhism’s instrumental view of politics and its basic pragmatism and
flexibility make it amendable to many different and culturally appro-
priate ways for putting its basic social principles into practice. In the
East, Buddhism has shaped societies as diverse as India and China, and
it is reasonable to assume that its social teachings can be integrated into
Western social theory and practice too.
In a Buddhist perspective, these “obligations” to care for others
broadly, both within and across societies, are not an imposition on, or at
odds with individual freedom or particularistic identities, but an oppor-
tunity for individuals to find happiness and fulfillment that transcend the
pursuit of personal desires or in-group advantage and gain real freedom
from excessive self or national concern. Moreover, this alternative view
of social reality is, for Buddhists, consistent with how all things actually
exist (interdependently) and consistent with our abiding human nature,
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which is, at its core, altruistic. From a Buddhist perspective, the sepa-
ration, insecurity, and fear that constitutes the starting point of Western
social thinking, is based in ignorance, not truth. Because this deluded
way of looking at ourselves and the world is pervasive, however, we must
work the problem, “free our minds” as it were. Buddhist’s call this exer-
tion on behalf of ourselves and others the “perfection of effort.” With
effort, everything comes.
Lest we think these ideas are mere fantasy, we can consider past and
present efforts to put these ideas into practice, however imperfectly, in the
ancient empire of Aśoka and in modern Bhutan. These examples are not
presented as earthly Shangri-las, but they each reflect an effort to pursue
policies of nonviolence, nonbelligerence, tolerance, equality, generosity,
good governance in supporting individuals’ holistic development, social
responsibility, mutual benefit, and rule of law.
Although a Buddhist perspective is different from those that predomi-
nate in the West, it is not, fundamentally, an alien one. Buddhism, while
ancient and “oriental” in its origins, at its core makes universalistic, not
particularistic, assertions—suffering, for example, is a human condition as
is the potential for liberation. And, as noted earlier in the work, many
Buddhist ideas accord with those of the Western Enlightenment and with
the principles of modern welfare state democracies, liberal internation-
alism, international society, and cosmopolitan ethics. Having introduced
this Eastern model to Western IR, and aware of their many common inter-
ests, this author encourages those concerned with a politics of human
liberation to continue the dialogue.
Buddhism and Science?1
This work concludes by considering a profound doubt that surrounds
a Buddhist prescription for the social world: is Buddhism, as a spiritual
tradition, “unscientific”? Specifically, the concern centers on two key prin-
ciples of Buddhism that are the foundation of its social theory articulated
in Chapter 2: first, the notion of the radical interdependence of reality
and, second, the assertion of an ultimately altruistic and perfectible human
nature. Although appealing ideas, even scholars sympathetic to inte-
grating Eastern philosophy with international relations, such as Acharya,
worry that these concepts might appear unrealistic, otherworldly, spiritual
aspirations and therefore outside of the scientific study of international
relations.
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To understand why Buddhist assertions might be viewed as outside
the scientific mainstream requires an appreciation for the relationship of
the natural sciences to Western social theory (including mainstream IR
theory) historically. Mainstream international relations theory, like most
Western political theory, paralleled and conformed with the Enlighten-
ment’s classical scientific tenets regarding the physical world: material
realism, objectivism, and localized physical causation. Social thinkers intu-
itively adopted these ontological and empirical assumptions and offered
theories of human nature and social possibilities based on them. The link
between the social sciences and the natural sciences was primarily meta-
physical, epistemic, and methodological; that is, social theorists adopted
the Cartesian separation of subject from object, self from other, and
mind from matter; the positivist assumption of the possibility of discov-
ering law-like generalizations about social behavior, much like scientists
seeking to establish facts about the natural world; and the preference
for third-party, replicable empiricism methodologically. The predominant
political and economic conclusion flowing from a classical scientific foun-
dation is that insecurity and conflict naturally arise in groups of inherently
real, independent, and self-interested actors. Thus, the benefits of society
are unlikely without a fear-based social contract, a “Smithian” economic
system that maximizes the benefits possible from humans’ propensity for
incessant competition, and by extension, the pursuit of a balance of power
among self-interested states acting in an anarchic environment. Buddhist
social theory, based on the ontology of radical interdependence, refutes
this approach.
The Buddhist assertion that human nature is fundamentally altruistic
and perfectible through mind training also contradicts traditional scien-
tific notions in biology and physiology. According to the historically
dominant scientific view, individuals have been hardwired over thou-
sands of millennia to be self-interested, competitive, even aggressive.
Social institutions can, at best, modulate and channel these propensi-
ties. For classical material science, the notion of molding one’s mind
through right view (intention), mindfulness (attentiveness), concentra-
tion, and meditation to reorient our thoughts, feelings, and actions in
a more altruistic and cooperative direction and claiming that our reality is
impermanent and wholly interdependent as Buddhism does, are unten-
able assertions. Buddhism, in contrast to materialist science, asserts a
causal power for a nonphysical mind and it treats material realism only
as functional appearance, not ultimate truth.
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During the past century, however, Western science itself has begun
to question the precepts of the dominant physical and physiological
paradigm and, in so doing, encouraged those of us in social disciplines to
reconsider our assumptions about reality, human nature, and the possi-
bilities for human behavior and social organization. Emerging findings in
physical and life sciences, much like Buddhism, suggest that reality may
be much more interdependent than we previously appreciated and that
our human nature and our ability to shape our thoughts and emotions in
more positive directions are greater than once realized.
To appreciate this convergence between Buddhist philosophy and
contemporary Western physical and life sciences requires a summary of
recent findings in quantum physics and neuroscience, which suggest that
our reality is interdependent and indeterminate and that the brain regen-
erates and reprograms itself throughout life in response to environmental
challenges and the mental force of intention and attention. These recent
scientific discoveries may be pointing to a different scientific picture of
reality and human nature, one that is consistent with Buddhist philos-
ophy. Recent scientific investigations, while speaking an entirely different
language than Buddhism, may be saying much the same thing about the
nature of our reality and our mental capacity. The quantum revolution
in the physical world and discoveries in the life sciences that address
directly the malleability of the structure and function of the brain (the
seat of human nature for modern science) are challenging the onto-
logical and epistemological foundations of materialism, objectivism, and
atomism and, by extension, undermining the presumed unchangeable
self-interested behavior that flows from these classical science foundations.
New findings in contemporary neuroscience and physical science
suggest that human nature may be more variable and flexible and more
susceptible to our mental training than once imagined. From this perspec-
tive, although we inherit certain morphology and traits, these traits, and
even the morphology, may be more malleable than we thought. We may
be able to change our thoughts, emotions, and the resulting behavior
through repeated mental effort. These ideas are relatively new, partial,
and highly contested, but worth our consideration. To better appreciate
these new scientific discoveries and how they are comparable to Buddhist
philosophy, below I provide a very brief outline of quantum science and
neuroplasticity.
6 A BUDDHIST ALTERNATIVE 93
The Quantum Revolution
A formal discussion of quantum hypotheses (they are numerous, varied,
and vigorously debated) is outside the purview of this book and well
beyond the author’s capabilities. The basic findings of quantum physics
and a consideration of their possible behavioral and ethical implications
are reachable and relevant to this discussion, however.
Quantum theory challenges the ontological and epistemological foun-
dations of the classical scientific worldview that formed the implicit
philosophical foundation for modern Western political thought, including
mainstream IR. Recall that under the classical view, reality consists of
material objects forever separated from the immaterial mind, and objects
exist independently of the subjects that observe them. Science concerns
itself with discovering the cause and effect of natural laws that operate in
the physical world. Causation is mechanical, determinable, and localized.
The mind, therefore, as a nonphysical entity, is no longer relevant or real
from a scientific perspective.
Quantum physics describes a very different world. When scientists
analyzed atomic and subatomic particles, the ultimate building blocks of
the material world, they discovered that they do not conform to classical
suppositions. In the subatomic world, particles have no definite position
or values, no fixed or material properties, until they are measured. Reality
does not exist “out there” independent of human choice and our observa-
tion of it. Instead, scientists found that subatomic particles exist—or can
best be represented as existing—as an immaterial wave of potential reali-
ties (probabilities) that only become fixed with material properties when
the subject observes them (the so-called collapse of the wave function or
the quantum leap). Before the observation, the quantum system has a
range of possibilities; afterward it has a single actuality.
This finding (upheld in countless experiments), that there is no fixed
reality until an observer asks a specific question of nature and observes the
answer nature provides, overturns the separation of subject from object
and mind from matter that have been the essence of the classical mate-
rial world-view since Francis Bacon. In quantum dynamics, observer and
observed are now understood as part of one system. They only emerge
as independent entities through the process of observation and measure-
ment. There are no objects independent of our conceptual designations.
Likewise, epistemology is changed by the quantum revolution. Rather
than certainty waiting to be discovered, the physical world is uncertain
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(existing as probabilities) and indeterminate. Physics then is about deter-
mining what is known or knowable, not about what “is.” There is no one
true and complete description of the way the world is. Physical theory
thus underwent a tectonic shift, from a theory about physical reality to a
theory about our knowledge, from ontology to epistemology. Science is
what we know, and what we know is only what our observations tell us.
As Werner Heisenberg phrased it, “What we observe is not nature itself
but nature exposed to our method of questioning” (Heisenberg 1962 at
p. 58).
Classical notions of mechanical, localized causation are also altered
by quantum science. Locality means that physical reality in one place
cannot be affected instantaneously by an action in some faraway place.
That is, separation implies physical independence absent a demonstrable
physical and temporal link (contact) between objects. Quantum theory
violates locality, at least in certain circumstances. Quantum “nonlocal-
ity” means that wave functions have effects on other wave functions in
the absence of any apparent, material, localized causal connection. Parti-
cles are “entangled.” Scientists discovered that when one wave function
changes as the result of measurement, the appropriate description of the
other wave function under examination instantaneously changes as well,
“and that ‘other’ can be as far away as one would like, from the other
side of the laboratory to the other side of the galaxy” (Schwartz and
Begley 2002 at p. 347). Particles are not atomistic and do not behave as
distinct objects, but operate as parts of a seamlessly interconnected whole
that absorbs their individual identities (Albert 1992). Quantum science
implies a radical interdependence among particles and a universe that is
more closely enmeshed than the classical worldview. In this realm, nothing
can be defined except in relation to another thing.
The possible ontological implications of quantum physics are truly
revolutionary. First, subject and object are reconnected in creating our
reality. Second, since everything is interdependent, nothing can be self-
defining and exist inherently. Finally, in the quantum universe, causation
ultimately is holistic, not mechanistic.
What then of the world as we think it exists, as tangible objects inde-
pendent of our minds and, absent a local link, independent of each other?
Quantum physics explains that, when one moves from the molecular level
to larger objects, quantum states normally “decohere” and appear to us as
classical matter, even though, ultimately, they do not exist this way. When-
ever particles interact in their environment, in a lab or in nature, they are
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in effect measuring each other, inducing decoherence (they are no longer
able to remain “entangled”). This decoherence explains why, in everyday
life, we see only material objects, not wave functions, and these objects
appear to conform to classical mechanics. Classical science can still study
observables, and classical physical theories explain more-or-less accurately
larger observed phenomena.
Quantum ontology forces us to distinguish between the way things
appear and the way things exist, between working “truth” and reality, or,
in Buddhist terms, between conventional and ultimate truth. Quantum
discoveries suggest that indeterminacy is the only absolute truth, that is,
everything lacks an inherent, fixed existence, or, to phrase it another way,
all things are interdependent. The usefulness of classical physics for inter-
preting the action of objects larger than atomic or subatomic particles
should not be confused with the ultimate nature of these objects. The
quantum view of matter and mind as dependent on each other refutes
metaphysical realism and is generally more consistent with the Buddhist
notion of the “two truths”—conventional and ultimate—discussed in
Chapter 2.
Finally, quantum metaphysics also avoids the two extremes of materi-
alism (all is matter) and idealism (all is mind). In quantum metaphysics,
neither mind nor matter take precedence as inherently real; together they
give objects a defined nature. Object and subject are, to use an earlier
Buddhist term, “dependent co-arising” (pratitya-samutpada).
A basic tenet of classical science is reductionism: larger objects can
be reduced to smaller ones in determining fundamental physical princi-
ples. Further, because physics is the science that explores the elemental
constituents of reality, it is foundational to other sciences and, implicitly,
social depictions of reality as well. Ironically, in pursuing reductionism to
its limits, physicists discovered a world fundamentally different from clas-
sical representations, and their findings challenge other scientific fields,
and I would argue even social scientific disciplines, to accommodate this
new conception of reality.
Reconsidering Brain, Mind, and Human “Nature”
In addition to revolutionary changes in the physical sciences, the life
sciences too have made remarkable new discoveries that challenge our
thinking about human nature as irreversibly self-interested and expand the
possibilities for considering our cooperative potential and corresponding
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social arrangements. Until relatively recently, the prevailing view in neuro-
science was that the brain contained all its neurons at birth, and the
number and circuitry of these neurons were set within the first few
years of life. Scientists believed that the only lifelong brain changes were
minor alterations in synaptic (interneuronal) connections and accelerating
cell death with aging. Social scientists in the Western tradition assumed
that this relatively fixed brain was, by nature, first and always primarily
self-interested and self-serving.
In the 1990s, however, neuroscientists discovered that the brain
continues to generate new neurons throughout life (neurogenesis) and
that new and existing neurons undergo structural and functional changes
in their circuitry in response to their environments, by training and expe-
rience (neuroplasticity). Contrary to what was once believed, the brain
is highly dynamic (Eriksson et al. 1998). When referring to changes in
the brain, it is important to distinguish between gross morphology and
cellular structure and function. The overall structure and pattern of brain
development is under genetic control and does not change markedly. But
our 35,000 genes are not up to the job of prescribing the wiring for
the brain’s 100 trillion or more synapses. These connections are shaped
by our ongoing experiences. It is at this cellular level that the brain is
remarkably plastic.
Neuroplasticity refers to altering connections in the brain, the strength-
ening, withering, or rerouting of synaptic connections. Neuroplasticity is
more than mere learning or storing a memory. The brain is far more
flexible than that. It can make wholesale topographical reorganizations
throughout life (Elbert et al. 1995). For example, experiments demon-
strate that some brain areas that were thought to be “hardwired” for one
function can in response to injury and adaptive effort, take on a totally
different function, what scientists call cross-modal functional plasticity.
Altering connections in the brain in a way that strengthens the efficacy of
a neuronal circuit over the long term is the essence of neuroplasticity.
How does the brain accomplish these adaptive feats? Various new
technologies are giving us a glimpse of this process. These new tech-
nologies are illuminating the neural correlates for specific adaptations
wrought through repeated experiences. These technologies can also show
us the brain areas and patterns of electrochemical activation associated
with a mental process. In discovering and observing the link between
brain circuitry and mental states, some scientists are also suggesting that
the causal connection between brain and mind works in both directions
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(Lutz et al. 2004). Specifically, they offer intriguing new evidence to
suggest that the processes of brain wiring and rewiring may be shaped
by mental (nonphysical) events. This work reveals that it is not just
experience that molds the brain. Rather, changes in brain circuitry are
generated only when behavior is specifically attended to. Attention (mind-
fulness), is required for use-dependent brain changes. In fact, imagined
physical movements, if repeated with concentration, can produce the
same synaptic changes as actual repetitive body movements (Schwartz
and Begley 2002; Slotnick 2004). Similarly, mental imagery correlates
with the activation of the same brain areas as those associated with the
actual perception of the imagined object. In short, mental force appears
to express itself through the brain, but it is not reducible to the brain.
Some neuroscientists began looking at the brain activity (“brain state”)
and cognitive and neural characteristics (“brain traits”) of meditators to
better understand the immediate and long-term effects of focused aware-
ness. These studies produced preliminary evidence for the possibility that
mental training may alter brain activity, shape the physical brain, and
affect human behavior. Early work by Richard Davidson, Antoine Lutz,
and others found that sustained thoughts activated certain neuronal path-
ways in the brain associated with the regulation of positive affect (like
compassion), reduced negative thoughts and feelings such as anxiety and
depression, and subdued self-referential thoughts (See Davidson et al.
2003; Pollard 2003; Lutz et al. 2004). These early studies lent support to
the notion that a willful refocusing of mental awareness could bring about
important changes in brain activity and structure (Brefczynski-Lewis et al.
2007; Lazar et al. 2005).
These initial investigations have led to hundreds of recent studies on
the impact of various forms of mindfulness and meditation on brain func-
tioning and morphology. Two “metastudies” (studies of studies) reviewed
these experiments looking for methodological reliable and comparable
results. One of these metastudies concluded “that meditation appears to
be reliably associated with altered anatomical structure in several brain
regions” (Fox et al. 2014 at p. 69). The brains of meditators were altered
in eight brain regions including areas related to meta awareness (our
ability to watch our own minds), body awareness, memory consolida-
tion and reconsolidation, self and emotional regulation, and infra and
interhemispheric communication (Fox et al. 2014; see also Afonso et al.
2020). The second metastudy concluded that meditation produces posi-
tive effects on cognitive and emotional processes (Sedlmeier et al. 2012).
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Several individual studies raise intriguing possibilities. For example, one
study found that meditators, unlike control subjects, had reduced activity
in “self-referential processing,” i.e., mind wandering, which appears to be
our default mechanism and is often correlated with unhappiness (Brewer
et al. 2011). Another study found that meditation increased compas-
sionate responses to suffering, even in the face of social pressures to avoid
so doing (Condon et al. 2013).
As noted, these changes in brain function and form do not occur
without sustained and repeated effort, however. Absent focused attention,
the brain will produce predictable patterns of brain activity, that is, our
default mode of thinking. Through choice and willful attention, however,
it appears that an alternative synaptic path may be activated and perpetu-
ated. The idea that immaterial forces such as intention and attention could
shape the brain’s function and form runs counter to classical materialist
science. Working in the materialist tradition, most scientists, including
almost all neuroscientists, have assumed that mental processes are ineffica-
cious byproducts of purely physical brain processes. To the extent that one
can recognize the mind at all, brain to mind is a one-way street. All our
thoughts and actions are reducible to impersonal, microscopic, physical
processes. Nothing that is nonphysical, such as the mind, consciousness,
or will, can even exist in the sense of being a measurable, real entity much
less shape physical outcomes.
This classical approach has been unable to explain how brain activity
gives rise to consciousness (subjectively felt mental states), however, and
what role consciousness might play in the brain’s workings. Why, if exclu-
sively local physical processes in the brain control us, do we possess
a stream of conscious thoughts capable of understanding large-scale
phenomena? After 350 years of classical material science and more than
half a century of neuroscience, materialist approaches have done a good
job of linking structure and function in the brain, but have made no
progress in explaining consciousness, something we all experience most
all the time. In the materialist paradigm, accounting for consciousness
is the “hard problem,” and because consciousness cannot be effectively
explained by reference to material forces, for most scientists in the clas-
sical material tradition, consciousness either is not a legitimate area of
inquiry or, if it is, they have promised, since the eighteenth century, that
a materialist answer to the hard problem of consciousness is only a matter
of time (Araujo 2012).
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The idea that the process of brain wiring and rewiring is shaped
by immaterial mental events may confound classical materialist science
(which either denies mind or separates mind from matter), but it is not
inconsistent with quantum science (which sees mind and matter as inextri-
cably entwined). Recall that in the quantum world, the subject determines
which of many possible realities becomes actualized through its intention
and attention. Quantum theory reunites consciousness with the causal
structure of nature, joining subjective experience and objective outcomes.
Thus, quantum theory creates a “causal opening for the mind,” a point
of entry by which mind could alter the functioning and shape the physical
structure of the brain.
Is there evidence for the existence of a “quantum brain” or “quantum
consciousness?” At this point we do not know, and it remains to be seen
where, if anywhere, there exists a demonstrable locus for quantum effects
in the brain. Because the environment for sustained quantum effects
to operate in the brain has not been sufficiently established, traditional
neuroscience argues that brain functions can, indeed must, be understood
as the interactions of neurons operating under classical physical principles.
Still, we know that quantum physics operates sub-atomically everywhere,
and we know that mechanical explanations of neuronal function cannot
account for the processing speed of the human brain. Furthermore, there
is evidence that sustained thought alters brain states and traits; we just
do not know how or precisely where this occurs. Quantum theory raises
the following question to material neuroscience: How can the mind and
consciousness be reduced to the function of atoms within the brain if we
know that ultimately these atoms have no fixed or non-probabilistic exis-
tence outside of subjective mental events? If atoms derive their properties
from interaction with consciousness [in quantum], how can consciousness
depend only on those same atoms? (Schwartz and Begley 2002).
In truth, at this moment, both materialism and quantum approaches
toward mind are meta-physical assertions awaiting more evidence, an
epistemic exercise. Science should be about epistemic pursuits, not meta-
physical closure, so let us keep an open mind. Asserting that a nonmaterial
force (thought) can shape a material object such as the brain, as quantum
theory does, is no more speculative than asserting a material basis for
nonmaterial consciousness, which is the prevailing materialist neuro-
science view. With the advent of quantum theory, the nature of matter
has become as problematic as the nature of mind.
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Implications of New Scientific Discoveries for Social Theory
I only report on this ongoing scientific debate to consider its possible
implications for the discussion at hand. As noted, some social scientists
wonder “Are Buddhist ideas harmonious with science?” The answer, I
suggest, is “yes,” they are remarkably consistent with the latest findings
in the physical and biological sciences, not “otherworldly.”
Coming back to the focus of this discussion (and firmer footing for
the author), the quantum explanations for brain plasticity and a causal
role for mind carry potentially important behavioral and moral conse-
quences for social thought and action coming from the world of science
(Wendt 2015). If true, they would imply that, although we are endowed
with a given brain morphology and basic circuitry, not all aspects of
our responses are passively determined by neurobiological mechanisms.
Instead, our volitional choices moment to moment to attend to one
bit of environmental stimulation over another and to form, through our
intention and attention (the driving force of karma, for Buddhists), one
thought pattern rather than another, can sculpt our brain and make us
who we are.
Cartesian science divorced morality from the material world by sepa-
rating it from the mind. Physical things just are; they are not right or
wrong. Our mind is just brain, and our brain is just an amalgam of
determined electrochemical processes. This view of mind as reducible
to classical physical forces is inimical to both moral responsibility and
personal freedom. But if the mind is not fully controlled by deterministic
physical phenomena and can shape thought patterns, emotions, and even
physical reality (such as the brain) by the choices it makes and the causal
efficacy of will, then mental phenomena are morally responsible. In this
view, it is the interplay between the electrical and chemical processes and
the role of consciousness that determines both our thoughts and physical
correlates in brain circuitry.
What then of human nature and the range of possible and ethical
human behavior and social organization in view of the quantum revo-
lution and recent neuroscientific findings? Evidence for the power of
the mind would carry profound implications for our understanding of
“human nature” and responsible social behavior, too. Some of the conse-
quences for social theory are clear. First, it would that mean whatever
we decide is our inherent nature (selfish, altruistic, or some combination
thereof), our nature may not be fixed and fully determined and it changes,
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in part through the mental decisions (actions) we make throughout life.
If this assertion is true, then it may be possible to alter the balance in the
mind between selfishness and empathy, between fear and compassion, and
between anger and patience through conscious mental effort.
The implications of this proposition for our moral responsibility are
truly sobering: ultimately, our brain is as selfish or as altruistic as our
mind trains it to be, and our behaviors and actions, including our collec-
tive actions are, ultimately, our responsibility. Furthermore, if society,
polity, economy, and even international relations in theory and practice
should align themselves with our best understanding of physical reality
and human nature and potential, then we would need to look anew at
our assumptions about human “nature” and the possibilities for our social
constructs.
Conclusion
Buddhism presents us with a wholly different set of assumptions about
ourselves and our relationship to others and all things. It recommends
political and economic institutions and policies that comport with an
ultimate ontological truth of radical interdependence and the ethical
responsibilities a trainable mind entail. Einstein reminds us: “no problem
can be solved by the same consciousness that created it.” A Buddhist
approach to today’s international challenges represents at its deepest level
an ancient, yet innovative, way of thinking about our social and natural
worlds, our ethical responsibilities, and “ourselves.”
Note
1. Portions of this discussion are taken from the author’s earlier work, Tantric
State: A Buddhist Approach to Democracy and Development in Bhutan, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
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Śraman. as , 61, 62, 68
Suffering, 6, 10, 21–26, 28, 30, 31,
36, 37, 39, 40, 43, 47, 54, 57,
64, 67, 76, 82, 83, 88, 90, 98
U
Ultimate truth, 21, 91, 95
W
Weber, Max, 10
Westphalian model, 2
